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The Impact of the Mexican Revolution on Foreign Invest
ment in Chihuahua and Coahuila, 1910-1920, (123 pp»)
Director:

Dr. Manuel A. Machado

The Mexican Revolution left a p
and
destruction in its wake as it ravaged through the
country. Caught up in the main stream of the turmoil,
along with the poor wretched Mexicans, were hundreds
of foreigners, symbolic of the policies initiated by
the regime of Porfirio Diaz. Many aliens suffered
immeasurably at the hands of rebels, Federales and
peasants during the entire course of the Revolution,
1910-1920. The purpose of this study is to examine
some of these depredations. Chihuahua and Coahuila
were singled out for the study because it was in
Northern Mexico, and chiefly in these two states, that
the intensity of revolutionary activity and foreign
investment was best revealed.
A number of works were consulted to put the compo
nent parts of the Revolution, as they affected the
degree to which foreigners were chastized, in their
proper perspective. Material based exclusively on the
depredations, their character and incidence, came
chiefly from three main sources. The first of these
were consular reports sent from American consuls in
Mexico to the American State Department entitled.
Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal
Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1920^ The second source was
the Fall Committee Report, Investigation of Mexican
Affairs, which details some of the incidents based on
the testimony of those involved. The third source used
extensively to capture certain incidents was the New
York Times from I9IO through I920.
The Revolution had a tremendous impact on foreign
investment in Chihuahua and Coahuila. Hundreds of
foreign lives were lost and foreign financial losses
were staggering. Seen as an obstacle in the Mexi
cans* quest for the social, political and ecom)mic
reforms that had been denied to them by the Diaz
regime, the foreigner became a very expendable item.
11
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PREFACE
In the late 1800*s and into the first part of the

1900*8 Mexico, with her abundant resources of oil and
precious metals, was indeed a prize sought out by many
foreign businessmen.

The gringos from North of the bor

der and other foreign entrepreneurs quickly capitalized
on the concessions offered to them by Mexico's dictator,
Porfirio D^az.

Oil men, miners, ranchers and a host of

other businessmen and workers moved into Mexico to lay
claim to a huge portion of Mexico's wealth, wealth that
Mexico would never completely recover.
Diaz and the Centificos, his hand-picked intellec
tual government workers, labored furiously in an attempt
to attract foreign investors to Mexico.

Supposedly,

foreign investments would eliminate the problem of Mexico's
sagging economy and thus, were courted at every opportun/

ity.

To some degree, Mexico progressed during the Diaz

regime, but the benefits of this progress never filtered
down to the masses who sank farther into the quagmire of
poverty.
American investors rode with the tide of prosperity as Diaz doled out land, oil, mine and railroad
concessions to them.

Their taxes, if any, amounted to
V

almost nothing and almost without fail, the American
received preferential treatment over the Mexicans.

Laws

were passed to protect them and Mexicans caught harassing
the Americans faced incarceration or, at times, death.
For years the Mexican masses took a back seat to foreign
ers, but because of the complete control exhibited by
Diaz over the people, they had to endure the situation.i
At the onset of the twentieth century the tight
/

reign of Diaz began to lose its grip on the Mexican masses
/

as opposition to Diaz began to come from diverse segments
of the population.

In 1905* the Flores Magon brothers,

Jesus and Ricardo, initiated a movement among radical
Mexican workers to completely destroy the Porfirian state
and its economic system.

The movement never amounted to

much more than an irritant to Diaz, but the seeds for
Revolution had been sown.^
/

When the aging Diaz, approaching senility,
decided to run for re-election in the election of I910
instead of stepping down as he had promised, revolution
sprang from all quarters.

Again, the economic system as

well as Diaz became the target of the revolutionaries.

York«

^Ronald Atkin, Revolution! Mexico 1910-20,(New
The John Day Company, 1969)» P* 22.

^Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico,
rev. ed., enl., originally published by Harvard University
Press (New Yorki
Atheneum, I97I), pp. 116-11?.
vi

The disgriintled poor of Mexico, for years coiled to strike
out at Diaz, became easy prey for Mexican caudillos seek
ing to swell their ranks with new recruits for the
struggle against the tyranny of the Porfiriato.
Mexico exploded with revolution as the all out
effort to destroy the Diaz regime intensified.

Every-

/

thing and everyone connected with Porfirio Diaz was swept
up in the swift current of revolution.

Years of depriva

tion had honed the revolutionary's blade into an instru
ment of vicious destruction as the rebels marched through
Mexico.
Foreigners, too, symbolic of the Diaz practice of
neglecting the Mexican masses while giving others innum
erable benefits, suffered immensely at the hands of the
/

rebels.

During the initial revolt against Diaz smd then

throughout the power struggle among the victors that
followed, the peaceful haven that foreigners had known
during the Porfiriato turned into a fiery hell.

The

purpose of this paper is to explain why this occurred and
also to examine some of the hardships that befell foreign
ers during the Mexican Revolution.
The states of Chihuahua and Coahuila were singled
out for this study because it was in these two states
that revolutionary activity and personages abounded.
as Christianity was born in Bethlehem and spread from
vii

Just

there to encompass the whole world, the initial revolu
tionary discontent seeds were nurtured in the northern
Mexican states, mostly in Chihuahua and Coahuila, and
from that focal point, emerged to eventually engulf all
of Mexico.

Throughout the Revolution, both states

suffered almost constant warfare and destruction from
contending factions.
Many of the men synonymous with the Revolution
were sons, either natural born or adopted, of Chihuahua
or Coahuila.

The long list includes four extremely

important figures involved in the struggle, Pancho Villa,
Venustiano Carranza, Pascual Orozco and Abraham Gonz^ez.
All four contributed something to the long list of
grievances exhibited by the foreign investors living in
Chihuahua and Coahuila.

Villa and Carranza, especially,

found the number of investors there to their liking as
they took sweet vengeance on Americans and foreigners
whom they disliked.

Another important factor and one

very critical to this study revolves around the fact that
these foreign investments outnumbered those in the other
northern states of Sonora, Durango, Tamaulipas, or Nuevo
Leon.
For the study, a plethora of information was
available relating generally to the political aspects of
the Mexican Revolution.

The two major sources used were
viii

Revolutioni Mexico 1910-20 by Ronald Atkin and Howard
Cline*s The United States and Mexico.
superb in style and content.

Atkin*s study is

Tracing the major happen

ings of the Revolution and also discussing some important
concepts that emerged from the struggle, the book is
invaluable to the researcher who seeks out a good under
standing of the Mexican Revolution.

Cline*s work some

times bogs down in detail, but one can not help but
derive much knowledge from the study, all of which was
very helpful.

Other works that supplied some information

on the Revolution in general were Lesley B. Simpson*s
Many Mexicos and Mexico the Struggle For Modernity by
Charles C. Cumberland.

Simpson, like Atkin, provided

important concepts as well as facts.
A number of works furnished information about
specific aspects of the struggle.

Four books were

especially helpful in the study of United States - Mexico
relations.

The first of these. The Mexican Revolution,

1910-191^1

The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict by

Peter Calvert points out clearly the problems created
when the United States attempted to intervene in Mexican
affairs during the turmoil.

Clarence C. Clendenen in

Blood on the Border The United States Army and The
Mexican Irregulars describes the intense Mexican hatred
of Americans that increased when the American Army
ix

entered Mexico in pursuit of the bandit Pancho Villa.
Robert E. Quirk's book. An Affair of Honor»

Woodrow

Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz discusses how the
American naval occupation of Veracruz was instrumental in
toppling the Huerta government from power.

Like Clenden-

en*s study. Quirk also focuses on the increased animosity
shown toward Americans because of the occupation.

Kenneth

J. Grieb in The United States and Huerta examines in
detail the controversy between Victoriano Huerta and
American leaders.

Reading Grieb, one is better able to

understand why Huerta and Woodrow Wilson became so
embittered toward each other.

This mutual hatred had

definite repercussions on Americans living in Mexico.
During the Revolution, the relationship between
England and Mexico was often as strained as that between
the United States and Mexico.

The Ph. D. Thesis of

Raymond Carl Gerhardt, entitled "England and The Mexican
Revolution 1910-1920*', superbly examined this topic.
Gerhardt based his study on the numerous notes sent back
and forth between the English Consuls in Mexico and the
home government in England.
Individual celebrities of the Revolution were
aptly described by Charles Cumberland, Stanley R. Ross,
/
/
/
/
Martin Luis Guzman, Diego Rosado Lopez and Michael C.
Meyer.

Cumberland in Mexican Revolution Genesis Under

Madero and Ross in Francisco I. Madero Apostle of Mexican
X

Democracy expertly traced in detail the events that
brought Madero to the Presidency, the actions by others
to replace him, and the inadequacies of the man to be
President in the first place.

Rosado Lo'pez work,

Historia y Pensamiento Economico De M^ico;

Comunica-

clones y Transportes Relaciones De Traba.jo presents the
/
Mexican's attitude toward Diaz and his practice of neglect
ing his own people and rewarding the foreigner. The
/
malice held by Mexicans toward Diaz is very evident in
/

Rosado Lopez* study.

^

/

Martin Luis Guzman deals with the

infamous patriot and bandit, Pancho Villa.

Guzman's

work. Memoirs of Pancho Villa gives the reader an
insight into the life of Villa and some justification for
Villa's actions before, during, and after the Revolution.
The last of the five authors to deal with individuals,
Michael C. Meyer, contributed two substantial works.

In

the first of these, Mexican Rebel Pascual Orozco and the
Mexican Revolution 1910-1915» Meyer delves into the
transition made by Orozco from muleteer to revolutionary.
Orozco's role in the Revolution, especially his relation
ships with Francisco Madero and Pancho Villa, is thoroughly
covered.

Meyer's second biography, Huerta A Political

Portrait, focuses mainly on the period of Huerta*s presi
dency, February, 1913» to July, 1914.

Meyer contends

that Huerta was not the counter-revolutionary portrayed
by so many other writers, but was instead dedicated simply
xi

to the moderation of the new energies promulgated by the
violent upheaval which began in I910.

It is a refreshing

look at a man, so often chastized by everyone.
The best accounts used to localize the Revolution
to just Chihuahua were Francisco R. Almada*s La Revolucion
En El Estado de Chihuahua Tomo II and Florence C. and
Robert H. Lister's Chihuahua Storehouse of Arms.

Both

works depicted, in great detail, many different stages of
the Revolution throughout the state as it progressed from
initial sporatic rebellions to full scale turmoil.
The pre-Revolutionary status of some Mexican
industries, especially those owned by foreigners, and the
Revolution's impact upon those industries is best described
in Rails, Mines, and Progress;

Seven American Promoters in

Mexico, 1867^1911 written by David M. Pletcher and in
Marvin D. Bernstein's The Mexican Mining Industry I8901950 A Study of the Interaction of Politics, Economics,
and Technology.

Pletcher concentrates his efforts on the

reasons why the promoters went to Mexico and the type of
enterprises they initiated there.

Bernstein's study

describes the Mexican mining industry completely and pays
special attention to the different types of taxes imposed
upon the mine owners by the Mexican Government.

The

Constitution of I917 and its effect on foreigners is
also very carefully analyzed by Bernstein.
xii

Whereas a large variety of sources could be
readily utilized when dealing strictly with the political
aspects of the Revolution, quite the opposite was true
with the availability of sources relating to the Revolu
tion's impact on foreign investors.

Since the study was

limited just to the states of Chihuahua and Coahuila, the
lack of available sources was very pronounced.

Most

American works consulted handled the topic on a national
scale, if handled at all, and the Mexican studies, with
very few exceptions, shyed away from the topic almost
completely.

Some help was found in Raymond Gerhardt's

dissertation and in Bernstein's book about the Mexican
mining industry, but Tulitas Jamieson offered much more
aid in her book, Tulitas of Torreoni
Life in Mexico.

Reminiscences of

The work vividly details some of the

vicious atrocities committed against foreigners, mostly
the Chinese, by various rebels and Federales in Torreon
during the course of the Revolution.
The futile search for quality material based on
a regional approach to the Revolution caused much heart
ache.

The author was not able to be as discriminating

as desired about some material because of the shortage
of available sources.

There is a tremendous need to

investigate the Revolution through a regional approach.
Far too often, historians have attacked the struggle
from a "big picture of Mexico" angle.
xiii

A much better

understanding of the total picture could be obtained by
analyzing the revolutionary movements on a regional or
better yet, a local basis.

All regions of Mexico were

not equally affected by the Revolution.

Some saw

virtually no violence while others, like Northern Mexico,
were caked in blood.

The presence in the North of most

of the powerful personalities of the Revolution should,
in itself, demand a thorough study of this region.

To

group all regions of Mexico together in one synonymous
category is absurd whether one talks about the pre-Revolution period, post-Revolution period or the Revolution
itself.

To know the whole of Mexico, one must study its

diverse parts.

Lesley Byrd Simpson captures my senti

ments best by speaking of the "Many Mexicos" to be found
south of the border.

Hopefully, other researchers will

bend their efforts in this direction as did William H.
Beezley in Insurgent Governor.

Beezley*s study centers

around Abraham Gonza'lez, Governor of Chihuahua, and the
fact that numerous events in Chihuahua epitomized the
Revolution.

Beezley contends that the failure of Madero

to formulate a national program capable of securing
revolutionary goals forced the necessary political action
to come at the state level.

Chief among the leaders of

this action was Abraham Gonzai.ez in Chihuahua.
The lack of material relating directly to the
topic forced the writer to extensively utilize three
xiv

major sources.

The first of these. The New York Times,

offered extensive accounts of Revolutionary events
especially when it involved danger to life or limb of
foreigners.

Also, any time American property was

threatened, the paper quickly picked up the story.
Another fine source that deals almost exclusively
with the problems faced by foreigners during the Revolu
tion is the Fall Committee Report that came out of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations entitled Investiga
tion of Mexican Affairs.

This two volume report consists

mostly of testimonies offered by the people, or their
friends or relatives, who were victimized in Mexico
during the Revolution.

Many interesting and informative

statistics also are found in the report which was compiled
at Senate hearings held in various United States cities.
The third major source, and easily the most often
used, was the microform reproduction entitled Records of
the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of
Mexico, 1910-1929*

In the microfilm, the course of many

of the events that occurred during this period is traced
by messages sent back and forth by consuls and American
businessmen in Mexico to the American State Department.
The Americaji Consuls in Mexico quite often had their
finger on the pulse of the Revolution and were quick to
send any information, especially when it concerned Ameri
cans, on to Washington.
XV

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
The Mexican Revolution of I9IO caused immeasurable
damage to Mexico.

The turmoil constantly subjected her

people to vicious cruelties and hardships and her coun
tryside became devastated almost beyond repair.

But, the

Mexican people did not suffer alone, because foreigners,
mostly American, Spanish and Chinese, also suffered from
atrocities committed against them by Mexican rebels,
bandits, Federales and peasants.

To understand why for

eigners received such harsh treatment during the Revolu
tion it is necessary to know why Mexicans of all classes
cultivated a deep hatred for them even before the
Revolution begsm.

It is also of extreme importance to

become familiar with the events of the Revolution because
they significantly affected the degree to which foreigners
became chastised at the hands of the Mexican people.
To the student of Mexican history, the granting
of concessions to foreigners enabling them to exploit the
riches of Mexico is synonymous with the dictatorship of
Porfirio Diaz (I876-I9II) because during his regime the
/
/
cientificos, Diaz* intellectual administrators, fashioned
1

2
the economic policies of Mexico that granted a large role
to foreign capital.

To finance the future of Mexico,

these advisors, convinced that the country lacked enough
liquid capital to implement their economic programs,
turned to other countries to obtain the needed money.
They hoped that this foreign capital would mix with avail
able local resources and eventually create, by the multi
plier principle, an ever increasing storehouse of funds.
These funds then would eventually be large enough to force
out the foreign investments.^
/
The Diaz administration labored strenuously to
attract foreign capital.

The offer of excellent returns

on their capital outlay, cheap land, rich oil deposits,
innumerable mines, and cheap labor enticed many foreigners
to invest in Mexico and once the newcomer entered the
country, he was treated with the hospitality due to any
invited guest.
The mining industry especially appealed to foreign
investors because the government changed the Mexican
mining laws to conform to the concepts and practices to
which foreigners were accustomed.^

Mexican laborers

could be hired for as little as one to three pesos per

^Cline, The United States and Mexico, p. 5^*
^Atkin, Revolution! Mexico 1910-20, p. 22,

3
/

day and the Diaz administration guaranteed that this labor
would remain docile by making strikes illegal.

The three

pesos per day wage earned by the Mexican laborer appeared
extremely cheap compared to the five dollars per day that
foreign mine owners paid their fellow nationals. 3
Construction of railroads during the Porfiriato
also depended to a large degree on foreign money.

For

eign concerns flocked to Mexico, taking advanta^^e of the

/
concessions and other favors granted to them by the Diaz
administration.

Utilizing European capital as well as

that from the United States, Canada, and Mexico, the rail
road system grew from less than 700 miles of track in
1880 to more than 12,000 miles by I9IO.

Although a series

of consolidations brought approximately 60 per cent of
the lines under government ownership, many of the rail
roads still remained under foreign ownership.^
With the discovery of oil along the Gulf coast
at the end of the Nineteenth centruy a third sector of
Mexico's national economy became a much sought-after

3
^Marvin D. Bernstein, The Mexican Mining Industry
1890-1950 A Study of the InteraciiTon of Politics, Economics, and Techology (New York: State University of New
York, 196^), pp. 8^-91; Atkin, Revolution!, p. 156. After
the first two years of the Revolution the peso had stabil
ized to a parity of forty-nine and a half American cents.
k

Charles C. Cumberland, Mexico the Struggle For
Modernity (London, Oxford, New York': Oxford University
Press, 1968), pp. 21^-217.

prize for foreign investors.

Two men in particular,

Edward L. Doheny, an American, and Weetman Pearson, an
Englishman, realized tremendous profits from the concesZ'
c;
sions granted to them by the Diaz regime.^
Foreigners involved in mining, railroads and oil
were joined by other aliens interested in ranching and
business opportunities.

Throughout Mexico, foreign

ranchers and farmers took advantage of the cheap prices
to purchase large tracts of land while foreign business
men opened up concerns of all types in the cities. Mex/
ico became a haven for foreigners as the Diaz regime
constantly favored them in legal disputes with Mexicans.
The government completely neglected Mexicans in all
walks of life while lavishing the foreigners with first
class treatment.

Depiction of this inequality can be

found in the illustration that many foreign companies,
besides paying much higher wages to their own national
employees, provided them with lodging that had lights,
water and ice, but did not have to furnish the same items
to Mexican workers.^
With the aid of foreign capital the long dicta-

^Atkin, Revolution!, p. 19^Atkin, Revolution;,,p. 22; Di^go G. Lopez Rosado,
Historia y Pensamiento Economico De Mexico Comunicaciones
Transporjjbes Relaciones De Trabajo (Universidad Nacional
Autonomia de McTxico, 1969), p. 357*

5
/
torial rule of Porfirio Diaz brought many surface improve
ments to Mexico, "but in spite of this, the methods he
used to bring about progress bred embryonic discontent
7
among Mexicans.

Utilizing the slogan of pan £ palo

Di'az rewarded those who supported him and punished those
who did not.

Literally speaking, pan o palo meant "Bread

or stick" and the opposition often received the stick in
a brutal manner.

By controlling the caciques or local

leaders, and sometimes rewarding them with a governorship,
Diaz secured control of all levels of government from the
8
national on down to the local arena.

/
With the insured support of Diaz, foreigners began
to export much of Mexico's wealth for their own profit.
The riches of Mexico flowed in a continuous stream out
of the country because many foreigners initially did not
pay any taxes.

While many aliens capitalized on the

wealth of Mexico, only a very limited few Mexicans
realized any monetary profits.

Foreigners sent capital

to Mexico and this only strengthened the rule of a
dictator who absolutely failed to spread the benefits

Vol. 2 (Fondo be Cultura Econdmica, 1955)* p« 22.

6
derived from this capital evenly among his people.

/
Diaz

had done much to develop his country, but because he had
completely neglected the bulk of his people, his rule
would no longer be endured. To one American mine owner
/
in Mexico, Diaz appeared to be the greatest man in North
America because he had made property "twenty times safer
in Mexico than it is in the United States".

But, to the

miserable peon who had lost his land and his livelihood

/
to foreign intruders because of Diaz* policies, the dic
tator of Mexico symbolized something evil which should be
9
exterminated.

/
Early signs of popular discontent with Diaz*
administration surfaced as early as I900 when an anarchist

/

group led by two brothers, Ricardo and Jesus Flores
Magon, published a newspaper, Regeneracio^, in Mexico
City.

The radical group organized a chain of clubs and

began to criticize the Church and conservative groups,
/
but before long, they began to attack Porfirio Diaz him
self.^®

In late I903 the brothers fled to the United

States to organize an attempt to overthrow the dictator
ship.

Constantly on the move because of persecution by

^Atkin, Revolution!, p. 22; David M. Fletcher,
Rails, Mines and Progress 1 Seven American Promoters in
Mexico, 1867-1911 (Ithica, New Yorkt~"Cornell University
Press, 1958)» p. 309 and p. 216.
^'^Pletcher, Rails, Mines and Progress, pp. 23623?.

7
agents of the Mexican government, they organized the
Jiinta of the Mexican Liberal Party in St. Louis during
September of 1905*

The platform of the Liberal party,

published in July, I906, called for political, economic
and social reforms and above all, the removal of Diaz.
Circulating propaganda throughout Mexico, the party
became popular among industrial workers, helped to organ
ize the workers, and also provided leadership for strikes.
Their activities revolved around the preparation for

11
armed rebellion against Diaz.
In 1906 laborers, urged on by the Partido Liberal
Mexicano (Mexican Liberal Party), began demanding better
wages and better working conditions.

A series of strikes

resulted when employers refused their demands.

In Cananea,

Sonora, a strike involving 2,000 disgruntled miners took
place on June 1.

Violence erupted when the office per

sonnel, most of whom were Americans, fired upon the
strikers.

No one suffered injury, but the strikers,

embittered by the shooting, embarked on a rampage of riot
and destruction.

The imposition of martial control

finally ended the disturbance, but not until after twenty
men had died.

The strikers, although forced to go back

to work under the same conditions as before the strike,

11

Stanley R. Ross, Francisco I. Madero Apostle
of Mexican Democracy (New Yorkj Columbia University
Press, 1955)» pp. 41-42.

8
still had influenced other laborers to strike in the
ensuing months.^^
On January 7, 190?, workers at the Rio Blanco
sugar mill in Veracruz rioted after they refused to
/
accept a judgement handed down by Diaz in his role as
arbiter between the workers and their employers.

The

judgement supported the employers' position on almost
every demand made by the workers.

Diaz sent in Federal

troops to quell the riot and they broke the strike by
killing many of the men in the streets and by later
executing 200 more.

This brutal act ended the strikes,

but discontent still existed in the labor class. Cony
vinced that Diaz was completely under the influence of
the industrialists, labor reluctantly had to wait for
reforms.^^
/

Diaz had failed the laborers and he also neglected
the Indian masses.

Forced in many cases to pay excessive

taxes on his land, the Indian also fell victim to the
y
graft involved in the Diaz administration. Corrupt
government officials often sold Indian village lands to
companies or to a single individual even though the
government had scheduled the land to be parceled out to
individuals.

12

The poor Indian, often left without the

Cumberland, Genesis Under Madero, pp. 16-18.

13
•'^Cumberland, Genesis Under Madero, pp. 18-21.

9
means to support himself and his family, frequently had
to work for a wealthy land owner who often treated him
as harshly as a slave.

Bound to the haciendas by debt

peonage, the Indian had no recourse to justice because
his pleas fell on deaf ears in the Diaz administration.
The Indian and the industrial laborer, understandably,
harbored violenty anti-Diaz sentiments.
Seeds of disy
content definitely sown by Diaz* policies soon would
germinate into rebellion.
/

Although Diaz put down small insurrectos through
out the country, political unrest grew markedly between
/
1907 and 1909. In I908, Diaz granted an interview to
James Creelman, an American writer from Pearson's Magazine.

In the interview Diaz announced that he would not

run for office again in the election of I9IO.

He also

stated that Mexico was definitely on the road to progress
and that the time had arrived for him to welcome the
formation of opposition parties.

The story broke in

Pearson's in February, and by March 3» 1908, M Imparcial,
the daily newspaper, published a translation in Mexico.
y
To those repressed by the Diaz regime for so long, this
news offered a glitter of hope.

Mexico teemed with

enthusiasm and political activity as the growing opposi-

^^Cumberland, Genesis Under Madero, pp. 21-24.

10

/
tion sought out a leader to replace Diaz.

However, on

May 30» Di^z performed an about face and announced that
Mexico needed him and he would therefore be a candidate
/

again.

But, Diaz had waited too long to suppress the

increasing opposition.

Anti-reelection clubs formed

everywhere and agitation for a change in government grew
extremely fast.

As the anti-reelection movement spread,

most of the participants threw their support behind the
growing presidential candidacy of Francisco I. Madero.
Madero had come to the foreground of Mexican politics in
1908 when he wrote a book entitled The Presidential
Succession in 1910.

The book exposed some of the evils

of the Diaz system and the enemies of Diaz utilized the
work as a manifesto to express their own ideals.

Firmly

convinced that the cure to Mexico's political ills lay
in freedom of elections, Madero*s political slogan became
"Effective Suffrage And No Reelection.
As more and more people read the book, the name
of Madero became known.

In June, 1909, Madero embarked

on a speaJcing tour of Mexico and received tremendous
y
response. Initially, Diaz paid scant attention to the
Maderista movement, but as Madero's popularity increased.

Atkin, Revolution!, pp. k2-kjt Florence C. and
Robert H. Lister, Chihuahua Storehouse of Arms (The Uni
versity of New Mexico Press, 1966), p. 210; and Ross,
Madero, pp. 44-45.
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/
Diaz took steps to suppress him.

Finally in June, 1910,

/

Diaz incarcerated Madero until the election of June 26
had safely passed.

On July 20, Diaz released Madero on

bail in the tovm of San Luis Potosi and on October 6,
the rebel fled to Texas, convinced now that the only way
to remove Diaz was by force.
Up until this time Madero found the thought of
armed rebellion abhorrent, but the circumstances forced
him to initiate his own insurrection and in November
he issued his political manifesto from San Antonio, but
he backdated it to October 5» 1910, to avoid the possibil
ity of the United States being blamed for harbouring and
encouraging a rebellion.

In the manifesto, called The

Plan of San Luis Potosi, Madero told the Mexican people
that he knew they were anxious for liberty sind determined
to reestablish a constitutional regime.

He reiterated

how Diaz had violated their individual rights and caused
them unbearable suffering from hunger while he labored
only to enrich his supporters and foreign investors.
Also, the plan voided the recent Mexican elections and
named Madero as provisional president.

Madero promised

that when his forces triumphed there would be a free
presidential election and a revision of all the laws
and decrees adopted during the Porfiriato.

Copies of

the plan circulated throughout the country and November
20, 1910, emerged as the starting date for the upcoming

12
16
revolution.
Revolutionary rumblings permeated the political
scene in Mexico after the distribution of Madero's plan.
In Chihuahua, initial preparations for November 20 matured
under the guidance of members of the anti-reelection
clubs as they scoured the country side recruiting all the

/
anti-Diaz elements.

Two of the recruits they found

would later play significant roles in the Revolution.
They were Pascual Orozco, Jr., and Francisco "Pancho"
Villa.
Pascual Orozco, influenced by the anti-government
literature of the Flores Magon brothers as early as 1906,
had completely dedicated himself to the anti-reelectionist cause by 1910.

Pancho Villa, like Orozco, came into

the rebel camp because of the recruiting efforts of
Abraham Gonzalez, one of the leading anti-reelectionists
in Chihuahua.Villa joined the anti-reelectionist move-

/
ment not just because the Diaz regime had branded him an
outlaw but also because of his love for Francisco Madero.

/
Madero's unshakable faith in The Plan of San Luis Potosi

16

Atkin, Revolution!, pp. 46-49; Fuentes para la
historia d.e la revolucion Mexicana, Vol. 4 (Fondo De Cultura Economica, 1957), P* 141; and Atkin, Revolution!,
p. 49.
17

Lister and Lister, Chihuahua, p. 211; Michael C.
Meyer, Mexican Rebel Pascual Orozco and the Mexican Revo
lution I9IO-I915 (Lincoln{ University of Nebraska Press,
1967), p. 17; and Atkin, Revolution!, p. 52.
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and his devotion to the struggle of Mexico's poor and
oppressed, even though he lived a life of luxury, com
pletely won over Villa's affection.

Villa enthusiasti

cally accepted the rank of captain and rode into the
mountains in search of more men while Gonz^ez commis
sioned Orozco as Commander of the Guerrero District.^®
Maderistas eagerly awaited the starting date of
the Revolution.

However, the uprising seemed destined

not to wait until November 20 to begin when, on November
5, an angry mob demonstrated in front of the American
consulate in Chihuahua City.

The mob sought revenge for

a fellow Mexican, burned at the stake in Texas for
killing an American woman.

They hurled bottles and

insults at the consulate and even though the Federales
quickly dispersed the crowd, anti-American feelings
persisted.
Anti-American hostility became increasingly pre
valent throughout the Republic toward the end of 1910.
The United States Ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson,
attributed this phenomenon to the memories that still

18

/
Martin Luis Guzman, Memoirs of Pancho Villa,
translated by Virginia Taylor (Austini University of
Texas Press, I965), p./21; William H. Beezley, Insurgent
Governor Abr^am Gonzalez and the Mexican Revolution in
Chihuahua (Lincoln? University of Nebraska Press, 1973)»
pp. 36-37*
^^Lister and Lister, Chihuahua, p. 212.

existed from the War of 1846, race antipathy, but mostly
to the resentment of American commercial aggression.
Through the collusion of officials and the courts and by
presenting fraudulent or outlawed titles, corrupt
officials began to confiscate American estates.

Through

out Mexico, Americans saw their personal rights constantly
OA

abused, often without due process of law.'*"
The Revolution began in earnest almost a week
ahead of schedule when villagers in the town of Cuchillo
Parado battled with Diaz* rurales.

Three days later

Pancho Villa and his band struck at San Andres, killed
/

the mayordomo of the Hacienda de Chavarria, and moved
into the house and the outbuildings.

Pascual Orozco and

his followers marched on the Federal headquarters at
Guerrero on the twentieth and other localities throughout
the state also came under fire by rebels.

Initial Mader-

ista victories inspired the rebels, but the Diaz forces
regrouped and quickly dealt the insurrectos a series of
defeats.

It appeared as if the Revolution would fail.

Madero, himself, abandoned his entry into Mexico and
returned to San Antonio.

20

However, the Maderistas in

Henry Lane Wilson to Philander C. Knox, 31 Octo
ber 1910, Records of the Department of State Relating to
Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929 (State Department
Piles of the National Archives, Record Group 59» M-274,
812.00/355)• Unless otherwise indicated all correspon
dence of the Department of State will be from the 812.00
files and will be identified only by the slash number.
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Chihuahua would not allow the spark of revolution to die.
Led chiefly by Orozeo, the rebels fought on, with moderate
success, into the early months of I9II.

Madero finally

entered Mexico in February to direct the campaign and the
movement gained more momentum.

By April, the flame of

rebellion roared in Mexico as diverse rebel groups,
/

other than the Maderistas, all lashed out at Diaz.

On

May 10, the Maderistas captured the important city of
Ciudad Juarez.

This victory signaled the end of the Diaz

regime as Mexicans everywhere, sensing the end was near,
joined the rebel cause.
/
At first, Diaz refused to accept the inevitable,
but on May 25, 1911» he wrote out his resignation. An
/
.
/
agreement reached between Jose Ives Limantour, Diaz*
Minister of Finance, and agents representing Madero called
for the installation of a provisional government.

The

terms of the agreement named Francisco Leon de la Barra,
Mexican Ambassador to the United States, to act as interim
President until Madero could be legally elected in Octo
ber of 1911.22
The interim presidency of de la Barra faced imme-

21

Lister and Lister, Chihuahua, p. 213; Ross,
Madero, pp. 126-12?; and pp. I3I-I66.
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Lesley Byrd Simpson, Many Mexicos, rev. ed.
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1
University of California
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diate problems as diverse elements throughout Mexico
made demands that the platform and policies of Madero
could not meet.

The Mexican people wanted their share of

the Revolution and they wanted it immediately.

Emiliano

Zapata, the leader of the agrarian forces in the state of
Morelos who fought so hard against Diaz, adamantly
demanded immediate land reforms.

The demands placed de

la Barra in a helpless position as his administration
did not have the means to please everyone at once.

Madero

found himself in a precarious position because the people
made demands on his platform, but he had not yet been
elected.
By the time Madero assumed the presidency on
November 6, I9II, his prestige and popularity had dimin
ished.

Continuous turmoil throughout the Republic and a

divided party added still more woe to Madero's plight.
Madero could not handle the situation.

Since he chose

to rule with sweetness and brotherly love instead of a
firm hand, self-seeking politicians permeated his admin
istration and Mexico again became victimized by an
/

administration as corrupt as that of Diaz, but without

^^Peter Calvert, The Mexican Revolution^ 1910-191^
The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict (Cambridge»
at The University^ress, I968), pp. 86-89; Berta Ulloa,
"Las Relaciones Mexico - norteamericanas I9IO-I9II",
Historia Mexicana, July - September 1965* Vol. XV, no.
1, p. 26.
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the stability of the Porfiriato.

By mid 1912, Orozco,

Zapata, and other caudillos revolted and the weak Madero
24
could not stop them.
Mexico exploded again with strife as general
strikes of mine, peon, ranch, and farm laborers forced
many concerns, foreign and Mexican, to close down.

The

perilous conditions prompted the United States State
Department to authorize Henry Lane Wilson to hand out
arms to Americans in Mexico for their own protection.
For fifteen months Madero struggled as President,
failing to bring peace to Mexico.

On February 18, 1913,

a coup led by General Victoriano Huerta removed Madero
and shot him to death four days later.

Of striking

importance to this coup is the fact that Henry Lane
/

Wilson worked with Huerta and General Felix Diaz in draw
ing up an agreement naming Huerta as provisional presiy
dent. The agreement allowed Diaz, who also had revolted
against Madero, to campaign for the presidency later.
Wilson also added to anti-American sentiment when he
refused to intervene to save Madero*s life.^^
The brutal killing of Madero by Huerta almost

Simpson, Many Mexicos, pp. 298-299.
^•^Luther T. Ellsworth to Philander C. Knox,
15 December 1911, /2638; Ellsworth to Knox, 1 April
1912, /35II.
^^Atkin, Revolution!, pp. 118-122.
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immediately fermented new revolts by Madero sjmipathizers.
Venustiano Carranza, Governor of Coahuila, rebelled and
began fighting on March 1.

Carranza, posing as the

defender of Madero in order to rally supporters in the
United States and Mexico, officially announced his revo
lutionary position in the Plan of Guadalupe on March 26.
The plan disavowed Huerta as President of the Republic
and conferred upon Carranza the title of First Chief of
the Constitutionalist Army with the power to make war on
the Huertista regime.

Carranza quickly received support

from Alvaro Obrego'n of Sonora, a veteran soldier in the
fight against Pascual Orozco's revolt.

The movement

picked up added strength at the end of March when Pancho
Villa initiated a formidable anti-Huerta campaign and
when Emiliano Zapata cast his lot with the anti-Huerta
elements.

With the addition of Zapata the rebels marched

on the capital from two sides, the North and the South.
Besides the growing strength of the opposition
in Mexico, Huerta faced the hostility of the American
government.

President Woodrow Wilson, extremely distressed

by the killing of Madero, refused to recognize as legit
imate the Huerta regime.

The failure of Huerta to gain

27
Kenneth J. Grieb, The United States and Huerta
(LincolnJ
University of Nebrask^ Press, I969), pp. 34-35}
Francisco R. Almada, La Reyolucion En El Estado de Chihua
hua Tomo II (Chihuahua, 1964), p. 30> and Meyer, Mexican
Rebel, pp. 96-IOI,
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this recognition brought many hardships to his administra
tion because Wilson permitted United States arms to be
shipped to the Carranza forces and constantly sought some
excuse to intervene in Mexico to depose Huerta.

Wilson

became obsessed with the idea of deposing Huerta, whom
he pictured as the symbol of everything wrong with Latin
America.

Huerta*s plan to pacify the country and then to

request United States recognition, based on this accom
plishment, fell on deaf ears in Washington.
As 1913 drew to a close the Constitutionalists
looked invincible, but in 191^, Huerta suspended payments
on national bonds and used this money to enlarge his
army and to purchase more arms and ammunition.

Military

successes now came to the Federal forces and the antiHuerta movement suffered a number of set-backs.

To add

further woes to their plight, a dispute arose between
Villa and Carran2,a which racked the Constitutionalist
forces with dissension.
As 191^ progressed, neither side appeared to hold
a distinct edge in the struggle.

Then a key victory by

Villa at the important rail center of Torreon gave the
Constitutionalists the advantage.

Villa's victory opened

the way directly to the capital, but even more important

^®Ross, Madero, pp. 336-337; Michael C. Meyer,
Huerta A Political Portrait (Lincoln; University of
Nebraska Press, 1972), pp. 111-112.
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it indirectly provided the opportunity for Woodrow Wilson
to intervene.
After Villa took Torreon, the center of fighting
shifted to the strategic oil producing areas around Tampico.

Many American nationals, protected by the United

States navy vessels at Veracruz and Tampico, lived in the
area.

When Huerta arrested some American sailors load

ing gasoline at Tampico, a major incident developed.

The

Federales released the sailors with apologies by the
Mexican commandant, but Admiral Henry T. Mayo, in charge
of the naval forces in the area wanted a twenty-one gun
salute as an apology because he felt that the United
States flag had been insulted.

Huerta would not comply

with this demand and Wilson, informed of the impending
arrival of a shipload of German arms sent to Huerta at
Veracruz, ordered Admiral Frank F. Fletcher to occupy
that port in retaliation to Huerta*s refusal to uphold
the honor of the United States.

The taking of Veracruz

cut off the supplies and revenues needed to sustain the
Huerta regime and less than three months later, on July
17» 191^» the defeated Huerta sailed into exile,30

29
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Cline, U.S. and Mexico, pp. 15^-155•

Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor Woodrow
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After Huerta*s defeat, a struggle raged between
Villa and Carranza for control of Mexico.

Mexico City-

wallowed in a state of confusion because it had to endure
so many changes of government.

Villa would occupy the

capital for awhile then be dispersed by the Carranza
forces, who in turn would retreat on Villa's return.

The

bitter struggle continued until April, 1915» when Obregon,
who remained loyal to Carranza, soundly defeated Villa
at Celaya in one of the bloodiest battles of the civil
war.^^
Woodrow Wilson took extreme measures after the
battle of Celaya.

Waiting to see who would emerge as

the victor before recognizing any of the participants,
he literally destroyed Villa when he cut off his supply
of arms and backed Carranza.

Villa retaliated by attack

ing Americans in Mexico and by leading raids against
Americans in the United States.

In March, 1916, Villa

raided Columbus, New Mexico and Wilson sent General John
J. Pershing into Mexico to catch him.

Reduced to the

status of a bandit. Villa made life miserable for
foreigners in Mexico.

32

By 1916, the Carranza government began to show
signs of stability, but because he refused to take advice

^^Simpson, Many Mexicos, pp. 304-305.
32

Simpson, Many Mexicos, p. 305*
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from his staff, many of his best men deserted him.

In

December, they forced him to call a constitutional con
vention at Quere'taro and out of this convention emerged
the present constitution of Mexico, the Constitution of

1917.

The new constitution, characterized by national

istic motifs and embodied with the needed legal machinery,
endeavored to end foreign economic rule in Mexico.

It

was also designed to alleviate the social and economic
inequities of the people, a revolutionary goal.33
The convention dealt a severe blow to Carranza.
Emerging almost powerless after the proceedings terminated,
he barely managed to complete his lackluster and reaction
ary term of office.

However, he still endeavered to

remain in power by imposing his own successor on the
people.

This attempt caused Obregon to revolt in April,

1920 and on May 21, I920, rebels murdered Carranza in
flight from the capital.

Adolfo de la Huerta, who also

revolted against Carranza, became provisional president
and Mexico legally elected Obregon as President of the
Republic in September, 1920.

With the election of Alvaro

Obregon the Revolution came to a close.

Under Obregon's

leadership, Mexico embarked on the road to peace, pros-

33
Simpson, Many Mexicos, p. 306; E. V. Niemeyer,
Jr., Revolution at Querdtaro The Mexican Constitutional
Convention of 1916-1917 (Austint University of Texas
Press, 197^)» pp. 233-23^.
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perity and the attainment of the goals that emerged from
34
the Revolution.
Perhaps, now, armed with a working knowledge of
the Mexican Revolution it will be easier for the reader
to comprehend the reasons behind the brutal treatment
received by foreign investors in Chihuahua and Coahuila
during the struggle.

The remainder of this study will

survey the diverse sectors of the Mexican economy in
which foreign investors in the two states were deeply
involved to take a closer look at the problems they
encountered.

Chapter II deals with foreigners involved

in ranching while Chapter III revolves around those
who invested in the railroad and the mining industries.
Chapter IV is concerned with foreigners engaged in city
businesses and Chapter V relates to some of the problems
that all foreigners shared alike concerning Mexican law
and taxation.

34
^ Simpson, Many Mexicos, pp. 308-309.

CHAPTER II

RANCHING AND FARMING
The lure of cheap and abundant lands and labor
drew many foreign ranchers and farmers to Mexico.

During

the peace of the Porfiriato, foreigners realized huge
profits as livestock and crops brought excellent prices.
But, with the beginning of the Revolution in 1910, farm
ers and ranchers found themselves constantly victimized
by revolutionaries, federales and bandits.

These elements,

seeking either to aggrandize themselves or to provide
materials for the revolution, took whatever they needed,
at the expense of the foreigner.
The lands and personal property of foreigners
became a special target to the Mexican.

As late as 1910,

only six per cent of the heads of families owned any
land at all and the desire for land, especially that
owned by foreigners, ranked high among the grievances
/

that initiated the revolution against Porfirio Diaz.
Bandits and rebels committed numerous depredations against
foreign landowners and the mistreated Indians, robbed of
/
their land during the Diaz regime, were especially
vindictive as they revelled in the sufferings of their
24
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former masters.^
With the initial outburst of the Madero Revolu
tion in 1910, foreigners saw trouble come from all
quarters.

The states of Chihuahua and Coahuila teemed

with rebel activity, instigated to obtain material for
the use of rebel forces in the revolt.

John R. Blocker,

the American owner of the Piedra Blanca Ranch in Coahuila,
early fell victim to the rebel onslaught.

General Caraveo,

an Orozquista from Chihuahua, and his band paid a visit
to Blocker and made their presence well known.

The Mex

icans took over one hundred horses and ten work mules
and then killed forty hogs and all of the chickens, milch
cows and calves on Blocker's ranch.

The rebels stayed

for four days, killed all the beef and took all the pro
visions that they needed to eat.

When they left, they

robbed the commissary of $3,000 worth of provisions and
left nothing to eat for the women and children on the
ranch.

Caraveo made his raid into Coahuila even more

profitable when he moved on to the ranch of G. 0. Delamain, an Englishman, and confiscated all of Delamain's
arms, saddles, bridles and provisions.

To help outfit

the soldaderas, the women who accompanied the rebel
forces, Caraveo also seized all of Mrs. Delamain's

^Fletcher, Rails, Mines and Progress, p. 18;
Gerhardt, England and The Mexican Revolution, p. 1^1.
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clothes.

In spite of the fact that Francisco Madero had

cautioned his followers not to molest the lives and
property of foreigners, the ranchers and farmers still
had to contribute heavily, often without compensation,
2
to the rebel cause.
As the Revolution intensified, anarchy prevailed
in the rural areas of Chihuahua and Cosihuila.

The insur-

rectos took advantage of the fact that Federal forces did
not dare to leave the railroads unprotected to chase after
them and rampaged unchecked through foreign property.

To

add woe to the foreigners plight, bandits, not connected
with the rebels or the Federales, emerged on the scene.^
By early 1911, farms and ranches in the North
found themselves completely at the mercy of bandits and
rebels.

Near Parral, Chihuahua, bandits besieged a dairy

farm owned by the Whatley family.

The family had started

their farm in I9OO with 200 Jersey cows, but little by
little, the property found its way into rebel and bandit
hands.

By mid I9II, it had almost completely disappeared.

One night the intruders, told by a farm employee that the

2

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Investigation of Mexican Affairs, Fall Commit
tee Report (Washington Government Printing Office, I920),
S. Doc. 285, 66th Cong., 2d sess., Iill77-1180j 1j11351136. Hereafter referred to as Fall Committee Report;
New York Times, 22 November I9IO (New York, New Yorks
Recordak Corporation).
^New York Times, 10 March I9II.
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family had $5»000, entered the house and demanded the
money.

The family pleaded that they did not have the

money so the bandits took one of the daughters outside
and threatened to cut off her fingers and her toes if
they did not get the money at once.

Continuous pleading

eventually convinced the bandits that the family did not
have $5»000 in the house so they took what money the
Whatleys had and left.

A short while later the Federal

authorities apprehended the same bandits, but the desper
ados served only one month in prison for their crime.
During the Porfiriato, the bandits would have been
shot!^
What help the Federales did give the foreigners
faded as the Revolution progressed and revolutionary
successes began to mount.

After the stunning rebel vic

tory at Casas Grandes on March 6, 1911* a wave of violence
spread throughout the North as rebels became more secure.
Depredations intensified, especially against the big
ranching concerns, when it became necessary to commandeer
more supplies to sustain the growing revolutionary forces.
The Palomas Land and Cattle Company, an American ranch
in Chihuahua, fell prey to numerous groups demanding
horses, cattle, saddles, provisions and money.

Passing

rebels often shot cattle just for the sake of killing

Fall Committee Report, 1»108^-1085.
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the ranch's beef and then left the carcasses to rot.
Rebels exacerbated the company's problems when they pur
loined their hay and cut their fences.^
Pascual Orozco expertly relieved many foreigners
of their property.

When Orozco's men confiscated all of

the cattle from a ranch adjoining the Babicora ranch in
Chihuahua, J. C. Hayes, manager of the ranch, took his
life in his hands when he foolishly protested vehemently
to Orozco.

Hayes maintained that the cattle belonged

to him and presented documents proving his claim of
ownership.

This proved to be his undoing, however,

because Orozco not only kept the cattle, but he incarcer
ated Hayes, contending that he carried illegal documents.
Fortunately for Hayes, Orozco released him a short
while later.^
By the end of March, as rebel advances increased,
protection provided by the Diaz regime for foreigners
virtually disappeared.

A mob of workers attacked six

Americans at the Corrales Ranch near Jim^ez, Chihuahua
and the Federal government, unable to help, authorized
all Americans in the country to take up arms for their
own protection.

Sensing victory, rebels increased their

^Fall Committee Report, 1:1103; Testimony of
H. S. Stephenson, Vice President of the Palomas Land
Company, 25 March I9II /1152.
^New York Times, 18 March 1911*
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confiscation of horses and supplies from foreign and
Mexican ranches to prepare for the final onslaught.

With

their backs to the wall. Federal forces initiated their
own horse stealing campaign in an effort to stop the
insurrectos."^

However, Federal action came too late and
/

the resignation of Diaz in late May finalized the Madero
victory.
/
With Diaz gone, foreign ranchers and farmers
throughout Chihuahua and Coahuila eagerly anticipated
some semblance of peace.

However, this failed to mater

ialize when anti-Madero uprisings began even before his
installation in November, 1911.

Ranchers and farmers

near Torreon, Coahuila encountered heavy bandit activity
in October.

For three weeks a large band of 150 bandits

embarked on a looting spree and committed numerous
depredations on the ranches and farms in the area.
Patrick 0*Hea, Manager of the British owned Cruces Ranch,
and his men successfully repulsed the first bandit attack,
but the employees threatened to desert him if he did not
get more assistance.

0*Hea managed to enlist aid from

the Madero authorities in Torreon and thus saved the
8
ranch from further attacks.

"^H. L. Wilson to Knox, 24 March 1911 /1053j
Thomas W. Voetter to Knox, 10 April 1911 /1360; and
Voetter to Knox, 13 April I9II /1394.
O
Ellsworth to Knox, 9 November I9II / 2 k 8 8 ,
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The brief respite enjoyed by the Cruces Ranch
slowly turned into a lull before the storm of new rebel
lion.

When in March 1912 a disgruntled Pascual Orozco,

angry at not being named Madero's Minister of War, joined
the anti-Madero forces. Northern Mexico again teemed with
revolution.^

The Orozco defection came after the open

revolt of Emilio Va'zquez Gomez and the followers of both
men brought more grief to foreigners.

To help finance

their uprising, the Orozquistas and Vasquistas, joined
by anti-Madero Magonistas and disgruntled peons, raided
and robbed the ranches throughout Chihuahua and Coahuila.
Magonistas detained an American rancher, Arthur B. Hines
and relieved him of his money, valuables, saddle, arms
and ammunition.

Hines continued on his way to a ranch

in Coahuila, arrived there on the fifteenth of March and
on the eighteenth of March the Magonistas robbed the
ranch.
The anti-Madero forces resorted to extreme means
to sustain their efforts.

The San Gregorio Ranch in

Coahuila lost all their horses, saddles, rifles and
ammunition to the rebels, but even more important, the

Q
^Clarence C. Clendenen, Blood on the Border The
United States Army and The MexicaH Irregulars (Londont
The Macmillan Company, I969), pp. 132-133*
^^Ellsworth to Knox, 11 February 1912 /2808;

23 March I912 /3398.
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rebels impressed all twenty of their employees into the
rebel army.

Throughout April, the Federales could not

cope with the power of the Orozco rebels, but early in
May, the tide began to turn as Maderistas, sparked by the
leadership of Pancho Villa and Victoriano Huerta, success
fully fought back.

Throughout the latter half of 1912

the dwindling Orozco rebellion resorted only to small
guerrilla raids and spiteful reprisals against foreigners.
Throughout the uprising and into 1913» foreigners
feared for their lives and withdrew from embattled areas.
John R. Blocker, who had earlier suffered at the hands of

/
anti-Diaz rebels, was one of many forced to abandon their
Mexican holdings.

Blocker left behind 100 fine saddle

horses valued at $5»000 and 1500 cattle, all of which the
Orozqustas commandeered.

No foreigner remained safe from

the fury of Orozco as Pablo Hoffman, a German farmer in
Chihuahua, discovered.

Forty Orozquistas swooped down

on his plantation, took his money and completely cleaned
out his house of everything portable.

The marauders

culminated this act of terrorism by dynamiting Hoffman's
house.

Fortunately, Hoffman saved himself only by out-

racing the rebels to the river and then swimming to the

^^Ellsworth to Knox, 3 April 1912 /3527} Paige W.
Christiansen, "Pascual Orozco« Chihuahua Rebel Episodes
in the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1915*** New Mexico Histor
ical Review, April I96I, Vol. XXXVI, no. 2, pp. 113-115.
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other side.^^
Although Orozco himself had fled Mexico in July,
many of his followers fought on.

As 1912 drew to a close,

Orozquistas resorted to kidnaping foreigners for ransom.
Arthur McCormick, manager of the Palomas Ranch in Chihua
hua was held until the rebels received $5»000 and the
abduction of John T. Cameron, another ranch owner in
13
Chihuahua, brought in another $2,500.
The efforts of the Orozquistas and those of other
anti-Madero forces, placed a severe strain on the Madero
administration.

His regime, never on a firm foundation

since its inception, faltered badly during the uprisings
and foreigners, able to survive only by paying ••blood
moneys* to the rebels, hoped for the restoration of pro
tection after Huerta successfully executed his coup
against Madero in February, 1913•

Unfortunately, their

hopes received a severe setback when an anti-Huerta move
ment arose almost immediately and swept through Chihuahua
and Coahuila with a fury far exceeding that of the Orozco
ik
rebellion.
Foreigners again found themselves at the mercy of

12

Ellsworth to Knox, 26 September 1912 /5128; 28
September 1912 /5l42; and New York Times, 9 February 1913*
^^Ellsworth to Knox, 1? October 1912 /5301.
New York Times. 15 April 1913.
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rebels, led by Venustiano Carranza, Pancho Villa, Alvaro
Obregon, and Pablo Gonz^ez.

Bandits also took advantage

of the situation and roamed the countryside, terrorizing
foreign ranchers and farmers.

One bandit, Maclovio

Herrera, led a band of 400 on a devastating rampage
through Chihuahua.

Herrera, violently anti-American,

destroyed foreign property with a vengeance.

Coahuila,

too, became so infested with bandit activity that many of
the foreigners who "toughed out" the Orozco rebellion
reluctantly had to abandon their property.
Constitutionalists (as the rebels were called)
spared no one in their drive to finance the new revolt
and foreigners contributed their share to the cause in a
variety of ways.

James D. Sheahan, an American who owned

a large hacienda at Jimenez, Chihuahua, lost 151 saddle
horses and a number of Percheron stallions, of no military
value, to the rebels.

Sheahan found one horse worth

$^,000 ridden to death about five miles from his hacienda.
Rebels in Coahuila kidnapped Frank Williams, a Texas
cattleman and held him for $1,000 ransom.

Williams could

only produce $125, but the revolutionaries accepted it
and theh freed him because no contribution was too small.
The rebels even asked a young American farmer in Coahuila,

^^John R. Silliman to William Jennings Bryan,
26 April 1913 /7^03.

3^
L. Childress, to donate if he wanted to.

Childress,

smart enough to see the folly of not contributing,
donated his last twenty pesos.

In return, the rebel

leader gave him a letter which recommended him to the con
sideration of any other rebel leader that came along.
Needless to say, the letter meant nothing to other revolu
tionaries in need of money.
British ranchers also contributed heavily.

W. B.

Cloete had to pay $4,680 to the Carrancistas before they
would allow his cattle to leave the country.

Charged five

dollars per head for each of his 936 cattle, Cloete paid
the fee to prevent the rebels from confiscating all of
his cattle.^"^
The Palomas Land and Cattle Company had more than
its share of trouble with the reactionaries.

Earlier

their manager had been kidnapped by the Orozquistas and
now, during the Constitutionalist revolt, the rebels
kidnapped their bookkeeper and forced the company to pay
a large ransom to have him returned.

However, the ransom

paid seemed extremely small compared to the thousands of
dollars that they had to pay the Constitutionalists for
the privilege of branding their own cattle.

By May, I913,

16

Fall Committee Report, 212400; Silliman to
Bryan, 10 May 1913 /7668.
^"^Ellsworth to Bryan, 8 May 1913 /7472.
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the company had had enough and complained to Secretary of
State, William Jennings Bryan.

Unfortunately for the

company, the United States was not in a position at that
time to intervene on their behalf.

To add insult to

injury, the rebel leader Maximo Castillo again kidnapped
A. W. McCormick, the ranch manager, in September.

This

1 ft
time his release cost the company $10,000.
Unhampered by Federal forces in Chihuahua and
Coahuila, the revolutionaries filched the beef of foreign
and Mexican ranches, slaughtered it, and sold it cheaply
to American butchers in Eagle Pass, Texas.

By killing

the beef first, the rebels could circumvent inspection
by United States inspectors who condemned live stock that
entered the area as a precaution against diseased cattle
19

entering the United States.

Cattle ranchers wilted under Constitutionalist
demands, but farmers in the two states received maltreat
ment as well.

Foreign cotton producers felt the sting

of Pancho Villa in October when he ordered the entire
cotton crop near Torreon, Coahuila to be harvested for
sale in the United States.

Villa volunteered to handle

the transporting of the cotton, but the cotton growers
had to pay eight cents per kilo of cotton as a war con-

18

New York Times, 11 May 1913? 3 September 1913•

^^Ellsworth to Bryan, 9 August 1913* 611.125/8.

36
tribution, which resulted in a severe loss of revenue
20
to the producers.

Constitutionalists relentlessly badgered foreign
ranchers and farmers throughout 1913 and the first half
of 191^.

Ma'ximo Castillo in January, 191^» ordered all

Americans to stay out of Chihuahua or they would be shot
on sight.

Castillo's anger was triggered by the refusal

of large American ranch owners in Western Chihuahua to
pay tribute to both Villa and Castillo.^^
During the first part of the year, the Constitu
tionalists, though racked by dissension between Villa
and Carranza, had Huerta "on the run".

Supported by

United States arms, it appeared as if the Constitutional
ists would soon be completely victorious.

However, an

incident occurred in February, 191^# which almost ended
the Constitutionalist dream.

Inflicting depredations at

will upon foreigners throughout their struggle, the rebels
went one step too far when one such depredation, commit
ted against an English subject, caused an international
furor.
The incident involved a man named William S.
Benton, a Scotsman who owned a 150,000 acre ranch west

20

New York Times, 22 October 1913# Silliman to
Bryan, 29 December 1913 /10757.
21

New York Times, 2? January 1914.
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of Chihuahua City.

Benton, angry because of the destruc

tion inflicted upon his property, went to see Pancho
22
Villa to voice his complaints, but never returned.
The stories are extremely varied as to just what
happened to Benton.

One episode maintained that when

Benton went to Juarez to see Villa, the two exchsuiged hot
words, a revolver was drawn, but no shots fired because
a woman stepped in between the two men.

Villa then

arrested Benton and later tried and convicted the Scots
man on a charge of conspiracy against the rebel govern
ment and with provoking and insulting General Villa.

He

was, according to this account, executed that same night
in front of a grave that he dug for himself.

One of Villa's

aides, Rodolfo Fierro, shot him through the head.^^
Another version of the killing maintained that
Fierro did not shoot Benton.

According to this account,

Fierro did force Benton to dig his own grave but, instead
of using a bullet, Fierro decided to kill him with a
blow to the head.
cuffed.

Fierro then buried Benton, still hand

Both of these accounts are refuted by a third

version, which holds that Benton never Left Villa's
office alive.

22
23

According to this report, he died after

New York Times, 19 February 191^.

New York Times, 20 February 191^J 21 February
191^1 and Fall Committee Report, I1I785.
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being shot by several of Villa's aides who thought that
he reached for a gun when he attempted to take out his
handkerchief.
A final version of the killing stated that Ben
ton's body had been stabbed and not shot.

Villa's men

then mutilated his body in a manner suggestive of savages
when they slashed it so many times in the breast and face
that even his best friends would hardly be able to iden
tify his remains.

This story also said that Benton only

went to see Villa in the first place to offer him rifles
in exchange for the right to ship cattle across the
border.
By whatever means and circumstance caused Benton's
death, the case caused an uproar from Mexico to London
and posed a problem for President Woodrow Wilson.

Since

the United States would not allow any other power to
intervene in Mexico or Latin America, a basic tenet of
the Monroe Doctrine, she took responsibility for the con
duct of other nations and for the protection of all for
eigners in this hemisphere.

Because of this and also

because Wilson actively supported the Constitutionalists,
many considered him responsible for Benton's death.

oil

France

Atkin, Revolution;, p. 170; Lister and Lister,
Chihuahua, p. 235*
^^New York Times. 19 March 191^.
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immediately blamed Wilson for the death and England
quickly followed suit.

English subjects throughout Mex

ico vociferously demanded an immediate investigation by
the English Consul in Chihuahua.

They also insisted that

England intervene at once to protect their lives, since
Wilson could not help them.

The United States averted

a major crisis only after William Jennings Bryan's promise
to investigate the death proved acceptable to England.
Bryan then formed a commission in the United States to
view Benton*s body in order to determine the exact cause
of death.
To state their position on the Benton case, the
Constitutionalists had made public the records of Benton*s
trial which asserted that Benton wanted to return to his
property, but Villa would not allow that because Benton
sympathized with the Federales.

Benton then drew a pistol

from his hip pocket and threatened Villa's life.

For

these crimes. Villa's court quickly found Benton guilty
27
and sentenced him to be shot. '
The American commission still wanted to view the
body, but the rebels would not turn it over to them
because they said that Benton was naturalized in Mexico

Atkin, Revolution!, p. 171; Gerhardt, England
and the Mexican Revolution 1910-1920, pp. 324-332; New
York Times, 25 February 1914; and 1 March I9I6.
^"^New York Times, 22 February 1914.
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and was, therefore, a Mexican citizen, an allegation
denied by Benton's widow,

George Carothers, American Con

sul at Torreoli, felt that the Mexicans delayed the commis
sion as much as possible while they exhumed Benton's body
so they could stand it upright while they fired a volley
of shots into the corpse to make it look as if he had been
executed by a firing squad.

Villa's chief medical officer

knew that this action would not fool the commission so
he began to prepare the body to be viewed by the Ameri-

28
cans.
At this point, Carranza, in spite of his quarrels
with Villa over military policies, intervened into the
case and halted the commission's trip to view the body.
Carranza demanded that the commission work through him,
and not Villa, if they wanted to exhume the body.

A few

days later Carranza ordered his own Benton inquiry, end
ing any chance that the commission might view the body.
After Carranza entered the case, the affair ended, just
as quickly as it began.

29

The affair afforded a close call for the Consti
tutionalists because if England had been able to convince
Wilson that the Constitutionalists should have been

28
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in
punished for the Benton affair, arms support may have
been discontinued.

The United States may also have inter

vened against the Constitutionalists.

Had United States

support been withdrawn and had intervention taken place,
the course of the revolution would have been drastically
altered.
While the Constitutionalists treaded somewhat
more lightly for awhile in their relations with foreigners
after the Benton affair, bandits still remained active.
In Western Chihuahua a bandit group connected with the
Federales and led by Rodrigo Quevedo demanded a ransom, to
be paid within twenty-four hours, from three American
ranches.

The bandits threatened to destroy the ranches*

windmills, water tanks and ranch houses if their demands
went unheeded.

The ranches paid the $6,000 to prevent

thousands of their cattle from dying of thirst.30
When the United States intervened in Veracruz
during April, 191^» Huerta lost needed revenue to continue
his struggle.

Constitutionalist victories increased

rapidly and by mid July, 191^, the struggle ended.

How

ever, the final split between Villa and Carranza, which
actually occurred one month before Huerta resigned, kept
Mexico in a state of turmoil as each vied for control of
the Revolution.

30

Again, foreign ranchers contributed their

New York Times, 7 May 1914.
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share to sustain the struggle of the contending factions.
Throughout the remainder of 1914 and into the new year,
foreign owned ranches and farms lost livestock, crops,
and money to Carrancistas and Villistas.

During March,

1915* Carrancistas under Maclovio Herrera looted numerous
ranches around San Carlos, Coahuila, and either killed or
carried away all of their livestock.

Herrera did not

enjoy the fruits of his labor, however, because the
Villistas overtook him and relieved him of the livestock
and his wagons.
X
Villistas, under Colonel Joaquin Terrazas, placed
more pressure on the Americans in the Muzquiz, Coahuila,
area when they demanded that each American-owned hacienda
deliver twenty head of cattle to the military authorities
or have their property confiscated.

George Carothers,

the consular agent at Torreon attached to the Villistas,
complained to Villa about Terrazas endeavors and Villa,
still eager to maintain United States support, rescinded
the order.

As a parting gesture, however, the violently

anti-American Terrazas seized all of the horses and mules
from the ranch of Herman Brendel, an American citizen.

P. Blocker to Bryan, 20 March 1915 /14648}
22 March 1915 /14662.
32
Robert Lansing to Carothers, 1 September 1915
/I5958; Carothers to Lansing, 4 September 1915 /l6028;
and Blocker to Lansing, I7 September 1915 /I6250.
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Throughout September, 1915* the Constitutionalists
forced Villa to retreat.

As he fell back, he seized what

ever livestock and provisions he could take with him.
The Constitutionalists, in the wake of Villa's retreat,
picked up what he left behind.

During the month, rumors

abounded about the possibility of United States recogni
tion for Carranza.

The rumors appeared very well sub

stantiated when the Secretary of State notified all
Americans and other foreigners that it would be best if
they left territory still held by the Villistas,

In

reprisal to the proposed recognition of Carranza, Villa
begsui to confiscate American property.

He also demanded

$50,000 gold from the Corralitos Cattle Company in Western
Chihuahua, owned by E. D. Morgan.

Villa threatened to

kill Morgan's entire herd of 5»000 if Morgan refused his
terms.
United States recognition for Carranza came on
October 19» 1915•

Woodrow Wilson pledged that he would

hold Carranza to his promises of protecting foreign lives
and property throughout Mexico, but Pancho Villa made
Carranza*s pledges impossible to keep.

Villa, incensed

with the recognition, vowed he would attack foreigners,
especially Americans, and said he was through dealing with

L. Cobb to Lansing, 30 September 1915 /1633^J
Gerhardt, England and The Mexican Revolution 1910-1920,
p. 392; and New York Times, 15 October 1915«

the United States.
As 1915 drew to a close. Villa embarked on a
spree of vicious reprisals.

At Tlahualilo, Coahuila,

Villistas encountered a Spaniard bringing in a herd of
goats.

When the Spaniard could not produce the invoice

covering his ownership of the animals, the Villistas shot
him and confiscated the goats.

Near Madera, Chihuahua,

Villa and his men seized the Babicora ranch owned by
William Randolph Hearst and his mother Phoebe.

The Villis

tas looted the ranch, drove most of the cattle away, and
then abducted an Englishman and four American employees. 35
By early 1916, Villa's continuous plundering was
widespread throughout Northern Mexico.

The helpless

Carranza could not stop the marauders and law and order
disappeared.

Villa returned to the Babicora Ranch in late

January, took 500 colts, and killed 250 cattle a day to
provide provisions for a new military campaign.
Bandits again took advantage of the situation
and the rural areas of Chihuahua and Coahuila bustled
with bandit activity.

Desperados completely overran the

34
Gerhardt, England and The Mexic^ Revolution
1910-1920, pp. 397-396V Carothefs to Lansing, 31 October
1915 /16653.
A. Williams, acting consular agent at Torreon,
to Lansing, 10 December I915 /I0965; New York Times, 15
December 1915*
3^New York Times, 25 January 1916.
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area around Torreon and Parras and most of the foreigners
abandoned their property, once again.

In Chihuahua,

bandits abducted Juan Bilboa, the cousin of an Italian
rancher named Enrico Visconti, and then murdered Visconti
when he refused to pay the $1,500 ransom demanded for
his cousin.

Fortunately for Bilboa, friends and relatives

paid the money to obtain his release.
When the Pershing Punitive Expedition began to
chase Villa after his raid on Columbus, New Mexico,
Villa grew more hostile.

Everywhere he went Villa

announced his intention of putting to death every gringo
that fell into his hands.

Still no help came from Car

ranza and Villa's depredations intensified.
Americans began to fight back.

But now,

At the Hearst Babicora

Ranch, eighty vaqueros were armed, the ranch buildings
barricaded and the windows rimmed with sandbags in
anticipation of Villista or bandit attacks.

In late May,
/
1916, bandits under the command of Atezutro Dominguez
and Pedro Castillo suffered almost complete annihilation
at the hands of a group composed of twenty-five of the
Babicora vaqueros.

The bandits, not Villistas, had

joined together to fight Carranza and Americans.^®

^"^Blocker to Lansing, 20 March I916 /175^^5 New
York Times, 20 March I9I6.
^^New York Times, 2 April 1916; 14 May I916; and
20 May 191^1
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The Hearst Ranch, with its armed vaqueros, would
surely have been safe from the likes of a former member
/
of Orozco's band, Jose Inez Salazar. Salazar decided to
start his own revolution about the same time that the cow
boys began to fight back.

On a daring raid, Salazar and

his band, all three of them, attacked the Santo Domingo
Ranch in Chihuahua and came away with several bags of
flour.

Salazar*s merry band consisted of a cripple, a

man with one eye, and another who was deaf and dumb.^^
The Hearst Ranch repelled the bandits, but could
not handle the Carrancistas.

Carranza, himself cantanker

ous toward the Pershing Expedition, ordered the seizure
of the Ranch because the Babicora Development Company had
sold cattle and supplies to United States authorities to
be used as provisions by the United States military
forces in Mexico.

John C. Hayes, the American manager of

the ranch, earlier had fled with 110 horses to keep them
from being seized by the Carrancistas.
Carrancista troops posed many problems for the
foreigners they supposedly had been pledged to protect.
Many soldiers deserted and turned to banditry because they
could not feed themselves or clothe and feed their fami
lies on the five cents a day that the Government paid

^^New York Times, 12 May 1916.
^^New York Times, 11 July 1916; 14 July I9I6.

^7
them.

Often, the hungry troops resorted to killing
ki
cattle and raiding fields to satisfy their needs.
The Pershing Expedition began to withdraw in
early 191? and relations between the United States and
Carranza improved.
active as before.

Villa, however, remained just as
Jose Inez Salazar joined the Villistas

and in February he attacked the American owned Ojitos
Ranch in Northern Chihuahua, kidnapped the ranch foreman.
Bunk Spencer, and held him until the ranch paid a $5,000
ransom.

Julio Acosta, another Villa commander, raided

and completely looted the Naherachie Ranch, owned by Mrs.
Phoebe Hearst, near Madera.

Villistas also looted the

Palomas Cattle Company as they ravaged unchecked through
42
Chihuahua.
Taking advantage of the fact that many Carranza
officials abandoned their pursuit of him and began loot
ing instead. Villa continued his reign of terror well
into 1920.

Caught between the Villistas, bandits and

rebellious Carrancistas, foreign ranchers and farmers
could only bide their time, hoping someday for an end to
their hardships.

James D. Sheahan, who had trouble with

the Carrancistas in 1913 on his hacienda near Jimenez,

Blocker to Lansing, 11 October I916 /195^; 1^
October I9I6 /19529.
ho
New York Times, 15 February 1917* I6 February
1917; and 17 February 1917.

typified the plight of the foreigner in Chihuahua and
Coahuila during the Revolution.

Each time Sheahan would

harvest his crop, the Villistas or the Carrancistas
would take it.

If the Villistas took the crop, the

Carrancistas would charge that he was a Villa sympathizer
and would damage his property.

If the Carrancistas took

the crop, the Villistas charged that he sympathized with
Carranza and they would damage his property.

Undaunted,

Sheahan kept plsinting his crops because he never lost
hope that someday the trouble would end, and when it did,
he would have something to make a new start on.^^
The foreign rancher and farmer who went to Mexico
with dreams of owning his own land and making a good
living from it saw his dreams turn into nightmares during
the Mexicaji Revolution.

Isolated, in most cases, from

any type of protection, the ranches and farms fell prey
to the demands of countless bandits, rebels, and Federal
forces.

Ranches and farms, once objects of beauty and

pride, were devastated almost beyond repair.

Countless

foreign ranchers and farmers, forced to abandon their
life's work, never returned again.

Often, those with the

courage to return to their holdings found nothing left
to come back to.

However, even if his property was

destroyed, he still had his life; many of the foreigners

^^Fall Committee Report, 2j2400-2401
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were not as fortunate.

As an obstacle in the path of

the land-starved Mexican's quest for his own property,
the foreigner was expendable.

CHAPTER III
MINING AND RAILROADS
The Mexican mining industry, from which the Conquistadores extracted so much wealth, fell into a pro
longed slump during the years following the conquest.

It

was revitalized during the Porfiriato as foreign owners,
taking advantage of the handsome concessions offered by
Porfirio Diaz, invested large amounts of capital in the
hope of procuring the remaining riches from the Mexican
mines.

Cheap labor and internal peace also added a

further incentive to the profit-minded foreigner.

The

foreign mine owners brought to Mexico a knowledge of
modern chemistry and new machinery so essential to the
exploration and efficient exploitation of the mines.

Diaz

provided railroads so the mine owners could more easily
transport their heavy machinery and supplies, enabling
them to open up new mines in remote areas.

The railroads

also made it much easier to get the ore to the smelters
and from there, the ore could be exported much faster and
cheaper.^

The two industries were tied closely together

^Bernstein, The Mexican Mining Industry 1890-1950,
pp. 17-20; p. 33.
50
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because the mines depended on the railroads to take their
ore to market.

When the Revolution struck, the damage

inflicted against the railroads severely affected the
mining industry as well.
The Mines

Like the ranches, the mines* isolated location
made them easy prey for bandits and rebels.

During the

initial stages of the Madero Revolution, the mines were
robbed of arms, ammunitions and supplies so frequently
that many mines closed down by March I9II.

One American

manager wrote back to the United States, telling his
friends and family that if they decided to visit him,
they would have to bring their own food because the rebels
had taken all that he had.

Trouble came from all quarters

as witnessed by the Boston Mexico Development Company in
Chihuahua which fell victim to 200 insurrectos who helped
themselves to provisions from the company store and from
the house of the manager, Daniel C. Sutton.

Several days

later, the company was robbed by the Federales.^
During the Madero Revolution, the mining compan
ies surrendered unlimited arms and supplies, and some
ores to the rebels, but surprisingly very little physical

2
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damage was done to the property.

During the Orozco

rebellion against Madero, however, rebel attacks on the
mines became much more destructive.

Two hundred
/
Orozquistas sacked the store of the Rio Tinto Copper
Company in Chihuahua and then burned the pumping plant
to the ground.

The company had already been looted three

times by the rebels, but this was the first time they
destroyed property.

Mine officials throughout Chihuahua

feared closing down because their men would join the
rebels and perhaps bring even more destruction to their
properties in retaliation for the low wages they received.^
The problems mining men initially encountered
seemed extremely minimal when compared with those brought
on by the Constitutionalist revolt against Huerta and
the ensuing internal struggle for power between Villa
and Carranza, once Huerta had resigned.

Carrancistas

and Villistas constantly visited the mines, impressed the
employees into their army, sacked and destroyed property
and often kidnapped foreign employees and mine officials
for ransoms.

Nils Olaf Bagge, president of the Almoloya

Mining Company between Parral and Jimene"^, encountered
Villistas far too often as his mine was robbed successively
by rebel Generals Urbina, Villa, and Herrera.

Herrera

^Consular Reports, 7 February 1912 /2776; Ellsworth
to Knox, 18 March 1912 /33^1» Letcher to Knox, 21 October
1912 /530^j and 26 October 1912 /5357.
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also kidnapped the mine's superintendent, impressed him
into his force, and did not release him until a 750 peso
4
ransom was paid.
While Villa and his men made life miserable for
the miners in Chihuahua, the Carrancistas swept through
Coahuila, preying on every mining concern they encountered.
The rebels seized so much property from the New Sabinas
Coal Company that the British owners had no choice but
to close down all their mines, leaving 3»000 men unem
ployed.^
The Mazapil Copper Company in Saltillo fell
victim to a demand by the rebels to contribute 50»000
pesos, even though the Federales still controlled Saltillo.
The request had been telegraphed from Concepcion del Oro
by the rebel chief Eulalio Gutie'rrez, who said that the
money would be used to buy necessities for "the Army for
the Restoration of the Constitution."

The general mana

ger of the company, P.E.G. Carr. notified Guti^rez that
he did not have the authority to use 50,000 pesos out of
the company's fund because if he did take the money, he
would be held personally responsible,

Guti^rez then

reduced his demand to 25>000 pesos, but said he would
blow up the company's plant at Concepci<^ del Oro if he

4
Fall Committee Report, 1j1429-1431.
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did not receive the money.

Carr sent the money and did

not tell the Federales of the threat because he feared
Federales might stop delivery of the money, forcing
the rebels to destroy the plant in retaliation.
Unfortunately for the company, the Federales
later found out about the transaction.

They then cut

the telegraph wires between Saltillo and Concepcion del
Oro and destroyed a number of sections of track of the
company's railroad believed to be utilized by the rebels.
The destruction of the track cut off the escape route for
many of the company's employees at Concepcion del Oro,
forcing them to endure rebel depredations."^
In August, 1913* the mining town of Lampacitos,
Coahuila, suffered complete annihilation by the Constitu
tionalists who destroyed over $1,000,000 worth of pro
perty, mostly French owned, in their attempt to eradicate
foreigners.

The Mazapil Copper Company lost over $1,000,

000 when the rebels burned the office buidlings and
smelter at their plant in Concepcion del Oro, the same
plant that P.E.O. Carr had earlier paid 25,000 pesos to
protect.

^John R. Silliman to Bryan, 5 June 1913 /7865.
"^Silliman to Bryan, 18 June 1913 /7996.
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On April 2, 19l^» the Constitutionalists entered
and sacked the town of Las Esperanzas, Coahuila.

During

the raid they forced A. J. Ruckman, general manager of
Las Esperanzas Mining Company, to march down the street
at the point of a rifle and ordered him to yell "Viva
Carranza," but, Ruckman refused, claiming his American
citizenship dictated that he take no political side.
Fortunately for Ruckman, he did not lose his life, but
the rebels still confiscated a large supply of provisions
Q
from his company store.
By the beginning of May 191^, foreign mining
companies in Coahuila forcibly contributed so much to the
rebel cause that almost every mine, financially unable
to operate, ceased operations.

Still, the rebels demanded

more, as Carranza ordered the siezure of the five largest
coal mines, all owned by French and American companies.
The companies, valued at several million dollars, still
operated, but now the Carrancistas, eager to provide
coal for their trains, supplied the manpower.

The 15,000

tons of coal and the 25,000 tons of coke that the company
had stockpiled also found its way to the Constitutional
ists* mineral coffer.^®
Coahuila miners wilted under Carranza demands.

^Blocker to Bryan, 9 April 191^ /ll^93»
^^New York Times, 28 May 1914.
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but Villa became even more belligerent to miners through
out Mexico after his split with Carranza.

Miners in

Villa's home state of Chihuahua especially suffered from
his hostilities during his reign of terror.

In July,

1915, Villa demanded a forced loan of $300,000 in gold
from Chihuahua Mining companies and followed up this
demand by calling a mining and smelter conference to be
held in Chihuahua City on August 9«

Fear swept through

the mining community that Villa would use the conference
to inform the miners that he intended to confiscate all
the bullion of precious metal mines and smelters and
then melt all the bullion together to destroy any means
of identification.

Fortunately for the miners, George

Carothers arranged a meeting between Villa and United
States Army General Hugh Scott before the conference
was to be held.

Scott and Villa met before in 1914,

when Woodrow Wilson sent the American General to Villa's
camp to explain the United States' position in the Consti
tutionalist struggle against Huerta.

The men became

close friends and nurtured a mutual respect for one
another.

Because of this reciprocal respect and friend

ship, Scott persuaded Villa to cancel his planned con
ference.

The miners breathed a sigh of relief, but the

respite was short-lived because after the United States
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recognized Carranza, Villa became even more vengeful.

11

Villa's actions after Carranza's recognition,
coupled with increased bandit activity, created havoc
for the mining companies.

Villa's robberies of trains

made it extremely difficult for the companies to trans
port their ore.

The employees of the American Smelting

and Refining Company refused to ride the ore trains unless
they received much higher wages.

They simply would not

risk the chance of meeting the infamous Villa unless the
companies paid handsomely for their services.

Many

employees of other companies refused to ride the ore
trains at any wage, so the companies brought in new
employees from the United States who would take the risk.
Unfortunately, many of the new crews never reached the
companies because rebels, and sometimes Federales, inter12
cepted the men and impressed them into their army.
Villa, alone, had almost paralyzed the mining
industry in Chihuahua and Coahuila in 1915.

The Pershing

Expedition in I916 stirred up even more anti-American and
pro-Villa sentiment, both of which worked to the detriment
of foreigners.

Although Villa curtailed his activities

11

Atkin, Revolution!, p. 172; Z. L. Cobb to Lan
sing, 26 July 1915 /155^5» 3 August 1915 /1563O; and Hugh
Scott to Lansing, 10 August 1915 /15719»

12

Marion Letcher to Lansing, 9 September 1915
/l6l64; Cobb to Lansing, 8 February I9I6 /l?3^5i and 11
April 1916 /I78I3.
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for a short while, anti-American Mexicans kept up the
attack on American mining companies.

Mexican mobs in

Parral, Chihuahua, sacked and burned American mining
properties after mob leaders had inspired them by firing
on the expeditionary force near Parral.

The Carranza

authorities in the city stood by as the frenzied mob
destroyed over $3,000,000 worth of American property.
To add to the problem, Carranza also helped himself to
200,000 ounces of bullion from the Alvarado Mining and
Milling Company of Parral.

He later graciously returned

75 per cent of the bullion, but still kept 25 per cent
13
as security for taxes.
Villa became active again in October, I916, and
looted mining towns throughout Chihuahua and Coahuila,
impressing all able bodied men into his army.

Villa

forced the men to join under threat of burning to death
their families.

In November he went to Parral, stole

seventy-five bars of silver valued at $50,000 from an
American mining camp.

At the town plaza he spoke to

the adoring throng about his overwhelming desire to
fight the American expeditionary forces.

After the

speech, American and other foreign mining men, fearing
for their lives, left for the United States.

One Amer-

^^Carothers to Lansing, 14 April I916 /I7863;
New York Times, 3 July I9I6.
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ican mining man, Howard Gray, did not make it.

The

Villistas shot him to death in his doorway and then
hung his body from Villa's mam column.
Villa kept up his assaults on the mining compan
ies and throughout the next four years he victimized
them constantly.

In June, 1917, Villistas raided the

Erupcion Mine near Villa Ahumada, Chihuahua, and detained
the English manager and a Russian well digger until they
received 3»000 pesos in ransom.

In late December, 1918,

Villa looted the offices and houses of the Cusi Mining
Company and burned about $20,000 worth of property.
Villa's increased activity around Chihuahua City
in early 1919» forced mining men to sleep at night in
Chihuahua City and limited their stay at the mines just
to the daylight hours.

Mining offices had to be moved

into town because Villa still maintained hope of receiv
ing steady contributions from the mining companies.

He

fervently made speeches to the mine workers, enticing
them to claim their rights and to demand higher wages.
The Villista struggle against Carranza, though
diminished, continued through 1919*

Rebels still sought

^^New York Times, 3 October 1916; 15 October 1916;
8 November 1916; 16 November 1916; and 8 December I9I6.
^^Cobb to Lansing, 8 June I917 /21028; L. C. Neale
to G. H. Shaw, State Department, 26 December I9I8 /22438.
^^J. Stewart to Lansing, 8 February I9I9 /22516.
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out materials and money from the mines to keep the move
ment going.

In March, the rebels raided the Providencia

mining camp near Saltillo.

In the raid, the rebels

looted the company store and took eleven cases of dyna
mite and considerable fuses and blasting caps.

From

the employees* homes, the rebels also confiscated food,
clothing, and blankets.^*^
Villa captured Parral again in April, 1919, took
all the trucks of foreign mining concerns, and made
heavy demands on the companies.

He called all the

foreign mine owners together and told them to operate
their mines, but ordered them to pay a certain amount
of money for protection.

One company, the Alvarado

Company, refused to meet Villa's demands so he took pos
session of the plant and melted down and confiscated
their silver bullion valued at $150,000 gold.

He then

placed dynamite in the plant and threatened to blow it
1 fl

up if the Federales attacked the town.

The year 1920 saw Pancho Villa finally retire,
but even before he left, his place was taken by the
supporters of Alvaro Obregon, who also revolted against
Carranza.

The Obregonistas, like the Villistas, called

17
'Harry Morgan, Vice Consul in Saltillo, to
Lansing, 18 March 1919 /22587.
18
Acting Consul Sterling to Lansing, 23 April
1919 /22644; 4 May 1919 /2269O; and 11 May 1919 /22689.
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upon foreign miners to contribute to their cause.

How

ever, their struggle proved much shorter than Villa's
and some degree of peace from rebel, bandit and Federal
demands finally came to the foreign miners in late 1920.
The long Revolution had indeed been "hell" for
foreign mining companies in Chihuahua and Coahuila.
Isolated even more than the ranchers, miners received
little, if any. Federal protection from the incursions
of those who robbed and destroyed their properties.

The

riches that lured them to Mexico in the beginning unfor
tunately also attracted the warring factions of Mexico
and by the end of the long struggle, much of the displaced
wealth found its way back into Mexican hands.
The Railroads
No industry during the Revolution suffered as
much devastation as did the railroad industry.

Railroad

trains and rails suffered daily destruction at the hands
of rebels and Federales who sought to stem the advances
of the opposition.

Trains were held up, railroad offi

cers kidnapped for ransom, and company offices looted
as contending forces and bandits searched for money
and materials to continue the struggle or to aggrandize
their personal well being.

Adding more woes was the

fact that foreign railroad workers, hated by Mexicans
because of the treatment they gave Mexican railroad
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passengers and because they received so much more pay
than the Mexican workers, often received brutal treat
ment or even death during the Revolution.

From one day

to the next, the status of every railroad company in
Mexico remained in doubt.

The companies had so many

troubles operating that one line in Coahuila, The Coahuila Pacific Railroad, had been nicknamed the Cuando
Puede (When It Can).^^
During the Madero Revolution, the Federales fre
quently blew up railroad lines to keep the rebels from
advancing.

When it became evident that the rebels would

win, many Federal soldiers deserted, turned to banditry,
and robbed the railroad companies.

In May, 1911, at

Monclova, Coahuila, ten Federal deserters entered the
offices of the National Railways and forced the cashier
to give them 30,000 pesos.

The soldiers then escaped

by taking one of the company's train engines, a coach
and two water cars.

As the robbers moved South, they

burned bridges behind them and tore down telegraph wires.
The deserters finally abandoned the train and joined the
rebels.
During the Orozco Rebellion, railroads came under

19

.
.
/
Jamieson, Tulitas of Torreon, p. 135*

20
^Ellsworth to Knox, l6 May I9II /1797; 18 May
1911 /I912.
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more attack.

The American agent of the line at Sabinas,

Coahuila, J. W. Perry, received a letter from the
Orozquistas telling him to bum a bridge at the station
or else he would be shot.

Ironically, the letter also

offered 5fO00 pesos to Perry if he accomplished the act.
Perry did not bum the bridge, but quickly left the
area instead.
In Chihuahua the rebels robbed so many American
train passengers that 1,200 American employees of the
Mexican National Railways initiated a strike.

They

believed the Mexican Government intentionally proposed
to eliminate them because the Federales had given them
absolutely no protection from rebel incursions.

On one

train trip alone, between Chihuahua City and Ciudad
Jua'rez, bandits relieved fifty American passengers of
2?
all their valuables.
When the Constitutionalist revolt against Huerta
broke out, the railroads suffered even greater losses.
At Piedras Negras, Coahuila, Colonel Jesu'^ Carranza
began the assault on the railroads when he robbed $3»000
from the pay car of the Mexican National Railway.

Actions

such as this during the bitter struggle forced many rail-

^^Ellsworth to Knox, 2 March 1912 /32l6.
L. Wilson to Knox, 26 February 1913 /6^75»
New York Times, 18 November 1913*
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roads to close dovm because of the loss of so much
money and property.

When the Northwestern Railroad, a

Canadian line, closed down in Chihuahua, Villa threatened
to confiscate the company if they did not immediately
repair and operate the line.

This threat forced the

company, in spite of danger to life and property, to
23
resume operations.
A major railroad disaster occurred in January,
1914, when Maximo Castillo, a ruthless anti-American
bandit in Chihuahua, set fire to a freight train and then
placed it in the Cumbre Tunnel, located between Pearson
and Madera.

Castillo then allowed a passenger train

to run far into the tunnel.

Although the passenger

train did not crash into the burning freight train,
thirteen Americans and fifty Mexicans suffocated from
the smoke and flames while trying to reach the entrance
24
of the long tunnel.
Both of the trains destroyed by Castillo belonged
to the Mexican Northwestern Railroad, which had more
trouble with bandits in 1915*

This time, bandits seized

Edward Ledwidge, the Commissary Superintendent of the
railroad, and two of his assistants.

From their camp

23
Ellsworth to Knox, 26 February 1913 /6475;
New York Times, 18 November 1913*
pli
New York Times, 8 February 1914.
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in the mountains, the bandits released the two assistants
so they could travel to Juarez to obtain the $10,000
ransom demanded to free Ledwidge.

Before the money

arrived, Ledwidge gave the bandits $13»000 in Villa
money in return for his release, but the bandits showed
their disdain for the worthless currency by burning it
in their campfire.

Fortunately, when the $10,000 reached

25
the bandits, Ledwidge was freed.
Depredations against the railroads in Chihuahua
and Coahuila centered around the activity of Pancho Vila
for the greater part of 1915 and I916,

As Obregcm closed

in on him during the Carranza-Villa contest. Villa made
a last ditch grab at goods and merchandise to forestall
his defeat.

At Ju^ez, he seized all the goods from the

railroad warehouses, including all the coal and coke the
railroad had on hand.

In a violent effort to get more

coal from the railroads. Villa threatened to burn all of
the foreign freight cars if he did not receive all that
he needed.

On January 16, I916, Villa, not satisfied

with his share of coal, burned a large number of the
freight cars and killed the bookkeeper of the Mexican

26

Northwestern Railroad.

^^New York Times, I3 September 1915*
PA
Cobb to Lansing, 4 August 1915 /1563^» ^ Novem
ber 1915 /I6703; and New York Times, 11 January I916.
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A few days later near Santa Ysabel, Chihuahua,
Villistas, led by Pablo Lo'pez, robbed a train carrying
thousands of dollars in currency and a large quantity
of merchandise owned by American miners returning to
resume operations of their mines after they had received
guarantees of safety from Carranza.

In brutal fashion,

the Mexicans forced the Americans from the train, robbed
sind then killed them, then stripped bare the mangled
bodies.

Only one member of the party, Thomas Holmes,

was fortunate enough to escape the ruthless massacre.
Lo'pez told the Mexican passengers to have a good time
and "watch us kill the Gringos".

To help them along

with their good time, L^ez also robbed the Mexicans.
Villa, who denied any responsibility for the
killings, said that Lopez completely exceeded his orders.
Since the robbers were Villistas, however. Villa still
received the blame.

The massacre touched off massive

mob protests on the United States side of the border,
but no United States troops entered Mexico to hunt Villa
down.

The following month, Lopez received orders from

Villa to return to the area around Santa Ysabel to hold
up all passing trains and to kill any American or China-

27
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man that might be aboard.

28

The remaining years of the Revolution brought
increased agony from all quarters to the Mexican North
western Railroad.

In June, 1916, Carranza seized the

railroad for a period because he needed it for immediate
military transportation.

After Carranza returned the

railroad, the Villistas started their attacks once again.
On November 6, 1917» they robbed one of the company's
trains South of Chihuahua City and escaped with the $100,
000 worth of silver bullion being sent to the United
States.

The following year. Villa extracted a $50,000

forced loan from the company and then again on May 29,
1919, the Villistas blew up $15»000 worth of the company's
bridges and railroad cars because the company refused
to meet Villa's demand for yet another forced loan.^^
Villa continued his plundering of railroads into

1920 when on March 4, he blew up a train, killed both of
the conductors and hung a Syrian passenger.

Villa also

abducted an American until he received a ransom for his
release.

28

Villa robbed all the other passengers and then

Atkin, Revolution!, pp. 270-271; Letcher to
Lansing, 9 February I9I6 /17268.
29
New York Times, 27 June I9I6; 7 November 1917;
Edward Dow to Lansing, 5 December I9I8 /22405» and 4
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looted and burned the train.
The railroad industry in Chihuahua and Coahuila
enjoyed little, if any, peace during the Revolution.
Serving as the transporter of supplies and men for both
sides, trains, bridges and track frequently met destruc
tion at the hands of combatants seeking to prevent them
from reaching their destinations.

As a carrier of

passengers and precious metals, trains were constantly
confronted by bandits, rebels and Federales, who sought
the wealth of their cargos.

No railroad company property

or railroad employee remained safe during the bloody
struggle.

30
/23419.

Consular Agent Stewart to Lansing, 6 March 1920

CHAPTER IV
THE CITIES AND TOWNS
Moving into Mexico after the miners, ranchers,
railroaders, and farmers came the foreign businessmen,
anxious to capitalize on the profits to be made during
the Porfiriato.

Merchants, bankers and industrialists

flocked to the cities and towns to establish their
businesses, and to build their smelters and plants.
Coming with them, in most cases, were skilled artisans
who, when mixed with the unskilled Mexican workers,
formed the corps of workers for the foreign concerns.
Because he received many times the wages of the Mexican
laborer, and found the cost of living very cheap, the
foreign worker lived very comfortably in Mexico.
At first, the foreigner found city life much more
advantageous than that in the country.

He had all the

conveniences, such as stores, doctors, hospitals, thea
ters and above all. Federal protection from marauding
bandits, few though they might be during the peace of
the Porfiriato.

The towns and cities proved veritable

havens for the foreigner, but when the Revolution began,
the haven turned into a fiery hell.
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As anarchy prevailed during the struggle, the
foreigner became easy prey for disgruntled lower class,
Mexican city dwellers who sought revenge for the infer
ior status that had been bestowed upon them because of
the Porfirista preference for foreigners.

Rebel and

bandit groups frequently enriched themselves at the
expense of foreigners and delighted in committing vicious
atrocities against them.

Throughout the Revolution,

scores of foreigners died at the hands of Mexicans,
often being tortured beforehand.

When each municipality

changed from Federal to rebel hands, the foreigner was
often singled out to die and, as the Revolution progres
sed, even the Federales sometimes turned upon him.
Caught in a vise between the contending forces and some
times unable to leave, foreigners suffered unbearable
hardships for the duration of the bitter struggle.
Before the Revolution actually started, foreigners
in the cities and town had some inkling of what lay in
store for them.

After the burning of Antonio Rodriquez,

the Mexican lynched in the United States for murdering
an American woman, an editorial in El Imparcial, a
Mexico City newspaper, appeared with the evident purpose
of exciting Mexicans to acts of violence.

Cries of

"Death to the Yankees" and "Down with the Gringos"
could be heard throughout the nation.

In Torreon,

Coahuila, workers at an American owned Rubber factory
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openly carried cards reading "Kill Diaz and his Yankee
friends".^

The anti-foreign sentiment grew rapidly and

before long, foreigners suffered increasing indignities
such as being elbowed off of sidewalks and many became
targets of Mexican insults.

As the rebellion progressed

and Constitutionalist victories increased, foreigners
in the cities and towns began to feel the burden that
the Revolution placed upon them.

Rebels blockaded cities,

causing prices to skyrocket, and eventually forced bus
iness, foreign and native alike, to come to a standstill.
Fear of riots and destruction of their property permeated
the soul of every foreigner.

Suddenly he felt alone,

unprotected and hated, as anti-foreign, mostly antiAmerican, feelings swept throughout Chihuahua and Coahuila.
Threats dictated the death of all Americans living in
Mexico if the United States intervened in Mexican
2
affairs.
Because he faced angry Mexicans inside the cities
and because he could not circumvent the rebel blockades
and railroad shut-downs, the foreigner found himself in
a precarious position.

By the end of March, I9II the

revolutionaries patrolled the entire states of Chihuahua

1
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and Coahuila and up to this point they still strove to
protect foreign interests.

But, in April, the rebels

began to utilize foreign businesses to their advantage
as their movement intensified.

First to contribute to

the rebel cause was the Madera Lumber Company in Madera,
Chihuahua.

The rebels completely took over the company's

machine shops so they could manufacture their cannons
out of old car axles.

The Guggenheim smelter in Chihua

hua closed down because all of the Mexican workers joined
3
the rebels.-'^
Throughout April, hope for an early peace faded
away as business in both states became completely par
alyzed.

But, aside from profit losses, foreign businesses

suffered very little physical damage.

By the end of the

month, the situation changed drastically.

Violently

anti-American editorials, claiming that United States
intervention on behalf of foreign investors was imminent,
spurred rebels and bandits on to violent destruction.
Insurgents attacked foreign property without regard to
the character or ownership of property.

Law and order

seemed to vanish as bandits operated freely under the

^Ellsworth to Knox, 18 March 1911 /1042; Marion
Letcher to Knox, 6 April 1911 /1318; and New York Times,
12 April 1911.
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eyes of the rebels, robbing everyone as they pleased.^
In Northern Chihuahua, on May 9, 1911* the
insurrectos ignited a fire in the business area of Ciudad
Juarez, completely destroying numerous foreign concerns.
Following the fire, the rebels embarked on a pillaging
and looting spree that lasted for hours.^
When the Maderista rebels under Villa took Torreon
on May 13» 1911 the city became a nightmare for hundreds
of foreigners, especially the Chinese.

As the Federal

forces guarding the city retreated, over 10,000 citizens
joined the rebels in race riots and property destruc
tion.

Many Chinese victims had their arms and legs tied

to horses and their bodies torn apart.

Some were drag

ged by the neck, dead and half dead, through the city
streets.

The rebels dragged Doctor J. W. Lim, one of

the wealthiest Chinese bankers in Northern Mexico, around
the town plaza until his body was badly crushed.
they shot and killed him.

Then

A Mexican mob entered a

Chinese bank building and found a number of newly
arrived Chinamen on the second floor.

The mob turned on

them with knifes and guns and then threw them out the
windows to the street below so other mob members could

^Letcher to Knox, 11 April 1911 /l^29i; 29 April
1911 /1430; and New York Times, 19 April 1911*
^New York Times, 10 May 1911; 15 May 1911.
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"finish them off".

Blood dripping down through the

bank floor and brains smeared all over the stairwell
served as grotesque evidence of the Mexican's hatred
toward the Chinese.

The rebels stood little children

up against a wall and brutally shot them down, despite
their cries of "No me maten" (Don't kill me).
women received the same treatment.

Chinese

Rebels incarcerated

two hundred Chinese for safekeeping, but while there,
the Mexican guards took all of their money and clothes.
Fortunately, they did not lose their lives.^
For three hours the slaughter of Chinese and the
looting of businesses continued.

Mexican children,

eight to ten years of age, strolled through the streets,
kicking and hitting the dead Chinese in the face and
then spitting on their corpses.

Finally, Emilio Madero,

Francisco's brother, arrived in Torrecm and stopped the
killing and plundering.

Madero ordered the looting

stopped "on pain of death."

Many of the people began

bringing back the stolen items and filled a dry irri•7
gation ditch with typewriters and other stolen goods.
The Chinese did not suffer alone as rebels
sacked American, Arab, and Spanish stores as well.

One

^Jamieson, Tulitas of Torreon, pp. 119-120} New
York Times, 22 May 1911; and 23 May 1911.
9

/

'Jamieson, Tulitas of Torreon, pp. 121-123.
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American, Paul C. Renard, had an office on the same
floor in the Chinese bank building where the Chinese met
their fate.

The Maderistas chopped through the locked

office stores and took everything that they could move.
O
What they could not transport, they destroyed.
When the ordeal finally ended, 206 Chinese lay
dead and the Mexicans buried them all together in a
trench dug outside of the cemetery.

Many attributed

the senseless slaughter of these people to the fact
that they grew fine vegetables and fruit, which caused
many Mexicans, not as thrifty or as hard working, to
cultivate a hatred for them.

Another reason put forth

is that the Chinese bore arms supplied by the Federales
and fired on the mob when they attempted to rob the
bank.

Whatever the reason, the atrocities committed in

Torreon set the tempo for many subsequent acts against
9
foreigners during the Revolution.
/
Even after Diaz resigned in May 1911* and Madero
became President in November, the situation still
remained critical for foreigners as anti-Madero upris
ings flared-up all over Chihuahua and Coahuila.

Anarchy

Q
Fall Committee Report, 1:1077-1082; Jamieson,
Tulitas of Torreon, pp. 119-120.
9
Carothers to Knox, 19 May 1911 /1895» Ellsworth^
to Knox, 2k May 1911 /197^5 Jamieson, Tulitas of Torreon,
p. 95; and pp. 119-120.

76
prevailed everywhere and foreign businessmen quickly
felt the brunt of the new rebellion.

Mexican workers

in all occupations voiced their complaints against the
Madero regime and conducted numerous strikes, again
bringing a halt to business activity.

Around Torreon

alone, 5»000 striking, disgruntled workers posed such
a potential problem that American and other foreign
families began to leave the area in anticipation of mob
violence directed against their property and their
lives.

The Mexican press, still violently anti-American

in its editorials, kept printing United States interven
tion articles to intensify the anti-foreign hatred through10
out the country.
General discontent with Madero, and the Vazquez
Gomez and Orozco rebellions in early 1912, brought
increased hardships to foreign investors.

Disgruntled

soldiers staged a barracks revolt in Ju^ez at the end
of January and looted the town.

During the drunken

frenzy, the soldiers shot two Americans and inflicted
so much damage on the town that the streets of Juarez
looked like cyclone damage in Western Kansas.

Almost

every store, curiosity shop, saloon, bordello, and bank
had its glass front smashed, furniture broken and all

^^Ellsworth to Knox, 17 November 1911 /25l8j
21 November 1911 /2562.
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the contents taken.

One French store lost $75»000 in

goods to the soldiers who also looted a German store
and then "burned it to the ground.

The German owners

estimated the value of the store and its contents at

$250,000.

American stores received especially harsh

treatment from the soldiers as American flags placed
in front of the stores seemed to spur them on to more
vengeful looting.

Anything the soldiers could get

their hands on they took.

Only the Banco Nacional's

steel vault saved the deposits there from confiscation
because they could not penetrate the thick walls.
After the incident, the Chamber of Commerce of
El Paso, Texas, called upon President Taft to take
action to protect the lives and the property of American
citizens in Ju^ez.

Taft sent American troops to the

border, but they saw no action because most foreigners
11
had already crossed into Texas for protection.
Vazquistas and Orozquistas roamed the North,
preying on foreigners.

Vazquistas held up Carlos

Schmidt, an American employee of the Continental Mexi
can Rubber Company in Torreon, three times on a 100

11
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mile trip he made.

His company closed down operations

because of the rebel seige of Torreon which completely
paralyzed business.

The American Smelting and Refin

ing Company, robbed nightly, lost over 10,000 pesos

12
and operated only one of its nine furnaces.
Residents of Torreo'n suffered as prices rose when
food supplies dwindled.

Eggs, for example, cost thir

teen cents each, and again hungry Mexicans blamed foreign
13
store owners for the high prices.
Fearing mob action as well as rebel depredations,
many foreigners throughout both states left.

Two hun

dred and eighty terror stricken Chinese from Goahuila,
remembered what had happened earlier in Torreon and

/
flocked to Ciudad Porfirio Diaz in hopes of obtaining
asylum in the United States.

Ik

Those foreigners who decided not to abandon
their property paid heavily for their decision.

At

Santa Rosalia, Chihuahua, Orozquistas under Jose'^ Inez
Salazar, upon capturing the town, called all the busi
nesses together, foreign and Mexican alike, and demanded
contributions to the rebel cause.

The rebels forced

12
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S. Pearson and Son, a British concern, to donate 11,000
/
pesos and the German-owned Rio Florida Cotton Factory
contributed 2,000 more.

All businesses paid something

and even an American physician added 500 pesos, under
duress.

In Chihuahua City, the Orozquistas called for

forced loans amounting to 1,200,000 pesos from members
of the Chamber of Commerce, banks and merchants of the
city.

The Banco Nacional, run by Frenchmen, delivered

the entire 275,000 pesos it had in its vaults and then
closed down.

Again, under threats of force and confis

cations, all businesses contributed.
Rebels seized whatever they could from businesses
of all sizes.

Luis Hess, an American, owned a shoe

store in Sierra Mojada, Coahuila.

He lost $66o, all

of his shoes, three horses and most of his other mer
chandise.

Whatever daily cash receipts he made from the

remaining merchandise he had to turn over to the rebels.
By the end of May, 1912, the Orozquista movement
began to wane.

In an effort to sustain their struggle,

the rebels put more pressure on businesses for funds.
Chihuahua City merchants, already bled dry, were told
to contribute an even more impossible 1,000,000 pesos.
All the banks in the city, except one, had closed down

^^Letcher to Knox, 19 March 1912 /3367» 21 March
1912 /3525» and Ellsworth to Knox, 17 May 1912 /396^.
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because of the lack of money.

Forced to abandon their

demands for the total sum, the rebels confronted busi
nesses individually to extort what they could.

The

American Smelting and Refining forcibly repurchased a
large quantity of ore that the rebels had stolen from
them.

Refusal presaged a closure of the plant.

Two

months later the company paid $5»000 for the privilege
of exporting eighteen cars of bullion to the United
States.
By October, the Orozquista revolt had ended.

Peace

settled in the cities much faster than in the rural areas
and businessmen received a brief respite.

The long

struggle proved to be extremely devastating to foreign
businesses, but had the foreigners abandoned their
concerns when the uprising first erupted, V^quez Gomez,
Orozco, and the other anti-Maderistas would not have
been able to sustain the struggle for as long as they
did.

For, only through the contributions extracted from

foreign businesses, could the movement endure at any
length.

When this source of income diminished, the

movement died with it,

17
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From October, 1912, to February, 1913» businesses
attempted reconstruction.

However, with the Huerta coup

that replaced Madero in February, Chihuahua and Coahuila
burst forth in anti-Huerta rebellions and again business

/
paid the rebel bills.

In Cuidad Porfirio Diaz, Coahuila,

Venustiano Carranza's brother. Colonel Jesus Carranza,
demanded that the foreign merchants raise ten to twenty
thousand pesos to pay and feed the State volunteers.
Colonel Carranza prevented all foreigners, except Ameri
cans from leaving the city so he could collect the
money.

However, foreign concerns refused to donate

even one dollar to him.

Carranza took the refusal in

stride and calmly confiscated over 100 car loads of
merchandise destined to the merchants from the Mexican
customs house.

Carranza then sold much of the goods

at prices so low that Mexicans, unable to buy shoes
before, strutted through town wearing the best brands.
All of the goods sold brought less than one half of its
wholesale value.

To receive the remaining goods, the

foreign merchants paid heavy ransoms to the Constitu
tionalists.

Carranza*s demands did not stop at the

customs office.

He ordered all foreigners to pay rent

directly to him instead of to their landlords.

To

prevent any retaliation, he also demanded that all
foreigners deposit their arms and ammunition with him.
Faced with threats of destruction and confiscation, the
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foreigners complied with Carranza's demands.

Jesus Carranza*s actions in Cuidad Porfirio

/
Diaz complemented the activities of his brother in the
interior of Coahuila.

Governor Venustiano Carranza

pilfered all of the state public funds and supplemented
them by making heavy demands on banks and merchants
throughout the state.

Carranza seized the railroad

cars of the Continental Rubber Company and sold them
to a German rubber msinufacturing firm at Monclavo.

The

German firm then shipped the goods on to New York to
sell.

Many businesses in Coahuila lost large amounts

of goods to the rebels, ''legally confiscated", accord
ing to Carranza, because the goverment in charge of
in
the State needed the goods to sustain their efforts. ^
Once again, businesses in both states fell victim
to demands of bandits as well as rebels.

One bandit,

Maclovio Herrera, and his ^00 followers sacked the town
of Naica, Chihuahua, robbed all the stores and resi
dences sind held an Italian businessman, Jose^Bovio,
until they received a ransom of $2,000.

Herrera and

i

his band also entered the camp of workmen building the
__
Ellsworth to Bryan, 1 March 1913 /6460j 2 March
1913 /6461; 5 March 1913 /6503; 2? March 1913 /6893j and
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1913 /7193.
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Conchos River Dam and demanded $25*000 under threat of
death to the English foreman.

The manager, J. W. Fuller,

an American, refused the bandits demands so Herrera
ordered him tied to a burro and threatened to send the
burro down a steep mountain side.

Fuller's associates

quickly offered Herrera $5,000, but he refused to take
less than $10,000, which he received.

Not satisfied with

just the $10,000, the bandits looted the homes of all
the foreign workers and then robbed the company store
of $7,000 in merchandise.

The experience proved to be

most frustrating to Fuller's associates, who had paid
$20,000 to free him from another group of bandits just
20
two weeks before the Herrera episode.

As the rebel movement engulfed Chihuahua and
Coahuila, business activity again came to a standstill.
In Torreon, smelters and factories closed their doors
leaving thousands unemployed.

Many of the destitute

Mexican workers joined the growing rebel army and vented
their revenge against foreign concerns as they went.^^
The lack of business activity worked tremendous
hardships on foreigners in Torreon.

Many wanted to

leave, but could not obtain enough money to do so.

Most

had so little funds that Henry Lane Wilson sent $1,000

^^New York Times, 15 April 1913» 1? April 1913*
21
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to Consul George Carothers to buy food for them.
City after city fell to the onslaught of either
rebels or bandits.

Sweeping through the North with

devastating success, the rebels spared no one in their
quest for victory.

At Saltillo, the rebels annihilated

a Federal garrison and then turned their energies on
the town where they looted and destroyed foreign busi-

/

nesses and homes.

In Ciudad Porfirio Diaz, the rebels

completely destroyed a Chinese laundry and arrested
fourteen Chinese, claiming the Chinese fired on them
first from inside of the building.^3
Bandits, too, joined the rebels in a reign of
terror as they invaded the town of Madera, Chihuahua,
in search of a posse of American cowboys who had killed
two of their band.

The bandits, in the unsuccessful

process of trying to reach the cowboys who had barri
caded themselves in a hotel, terrorized other Americans
in town.

They rode through the streets, looted Ameri

can homes, threatened to burn the American lumber
companies there, and to kill all the men and take the
women for ransom.

They abducted two American lumber

men and held them for ransom.

Another American, John

^^New York Times, 13 July 1913^^John Silliman to Bryan, 21 May 1913 /756B;
Ellsworth to Bryan, 28 May I9I3 /762k.
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Parks, had his left ear severed and his face slashed
by a bandit's sabre.

The assault on Parks, brought on

by his refusal to give money to the bandits, was wit
nessed by his wife and children.
An American Congressman, William R. Smith of
Texas, wanted Woodrow Wilson to send troops to Madera
to protect the Americans, but Wilson told Smith that
Pancho Villa, still courting United States aid, would
protect Americans there.

The force Villa sent to Madera

successfully chased the bandits away from the Americans,
but a few days later a Federal force routed the Villistas and then arrested five American officers of the
Madera Lumber Company for being Constitutionalist
sympathizers.25
The Madera Lumber Company's troubles did not end
yet.

In August, bandits under M^imo Castillo took

1,200 pesos from the company's safe, then, a week later,
they kidnapped G. Duthe, the American manager of the
power plant until the company paid a large ransom.

Later

on in August, the Castillo band murdered Edmond Hayes,
the manager of the company.

Castillo's men, affiliated

with Huerta's Federal forces, had not been paid for

^^New York Times, 20 July 1913; 23 July 1913» and
July 1913.
^^New York Times, 24 July 1913; 6 August 1913*
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some time.

To appease the bandits, the Federales allowed

them to loot for twenty-four hours.

Hayes died as a

result of this action because he refused Castillo's
demand for money.

After this occurrence, most of the

100 Americans, along with several Germans and seventyfive Chinese departed for the United States.^^
Federal activities imposed additional hardships
on foreigners.

/

In beleaguered Torreon, Federales took

food from Americans and gave it to the soldiers.

Since

the rebels had cut off the food supply lines, civilians
received just enough food to sustain life and the rest
went to the soldiers.

Torreon seethed with epidemics

of smallpox, scarlatina and typhus.

Sanitary conditions

were almost nonexistant as pestilance from dead humans,
horses, and mules crept into the city.
denied foreigners the right to leave.

Still, Federales
However, Frank

and Milton Chessam and Andrew Odel, ignored the Federal
orders and escaped from the death trap.

The three

/

Americans procured mules from the area around Torreon
and rode 600 miles to Piedras Negras.^"^

Some foreigners not as fortunate as the Chessams
and Odel suffered immeasurably.

Federales under General

Bravo executed six Americans in August, claiming they

26
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supported the Constitutionalists.

Carothers protested

to Bravo, who told him that the affair was none of his
business.

Bravo felt that since the United States did

not recognize the Huerta government, he would not recogpQ
nize Carother's authority.
Federales harassed other foreigners besides
those in Torreon.

In all the cities in Chihuahua and

Coahuila still controlled by Huerta, foreign companies
and individuals forcibly contributed large amounts of
money to the Federal troops stationed there.

Some

American companies paid several thousand pesos per week
for Federal "protection".

Managers of the companies

would not make statements in this regard to Washington
2Q
officials from fear of Federal retribution. ^
Foreign investors not only contributed money to
the Federales. but also contributed manpower.

Many

concerns closed down because their Mexican labor force
was conscripted into the Federal Army.

The Guggenheim

property in Chihuahua City, alone, lost almost all of
its ^,000 native laborers because the Federales needed
them to bolster their forces in the struggle against
the Villistas in Chihuahua.

28
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Parral, Chihuahua, greatly resembled Torre<^
during the fall of 1913*

When the Constitutionalists

took the city, they levied forced loans on all foreigners.
There, too, foreigners faced starvation as food supplies
became exhausted and what did exist, first went to the
Constitutionalist soldiers.

Natives boycotted American

businesses and spent absolutely no money at American
stores if the Mexican's could buy the needed items from
31

the Germans, French, or any other foreigner.^

In October, 1913» "the rebels took Torreon, but
instead of relief, foreigners faced added burdens.

Upon

entering the city, the Villistas demanded a 3 million
peso "loan" from everyone (except Americans) in the
district.

Three weeks after their initial entrance into

Torreon, the Villistas had executed twenty-six Spaniards
who refused to meet their monetary demands.

Villa,

however, did allow foreigners to leave once they ful
filled their monetary obligations.^^
At Ju^ez, Villa again became displeased with the
Spanish, this time because they would not accept his
fiat money, and because they closed their doors and
refused to deal with him.

Spanish property escaped

^^New York Times, ^ September 1913*
^^Silliman to Bryan, 25 October 1913 /9311» ^
November 1913 /96l4; and 29 November 1913 /9983*
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confiscation only because American consul Thomas Edwards
accepted custody of it, and Villa refused to challenge
United States authority.This refusal, however, did
not necessarily extend to American business concerns.
While still in Ju^ez, Villa swore he would bar the
Western Union Telegraph Company from Mexico for their
refusal to do business with him.

Villa maintained

that this action came about because the company had an
agreement with Huerta, whereby it would not operate in
rih,
rebel-held territory.-^
Villa announced in December that he would give
full protection to all foreigners who remained neutral
in Mexican political affairs.

Those who had given any

support at all to the Huerta administration would have
their property confiscated.
carried out this pledge.

In Chihuahua City, he

As a reprisal against mer

chants, mostly Spanish, for not accepting his fiat
money. Villa confiscated $100,000 worth of merchandise
from the Banco Minero.

Spanish merchants closed their

shops down and gave the keys to Consul Edwards again.
But, this time, Villistas did challenge Edwards author
ity when they broke into the Spanish shops and looted
them.

Edwards returned the keys to the Spanish because

33

New York Times, 28 November 1913*

34
New York Times, 29 November 1913*

90
he could not protect the property.

Villa sold most of

the confiscated stock to the poor Mexicans in Chihuahua.35
Villa's hatred for the Spanish became quite
evident in Chihuahua City.

Not only did he confiscate

their goods and extract $1,500,000 in gold from them,
but he ordered them out of the state within ten days,
under penalty of death.

Villa also assailed Spanish

nuns and priests as he confiscated their property and
demanded $5>000 from each of the priests.
As of December 21, 1913» Villa had confiscated
all of the property of Spanish subjects in Chihuahua.
The property amounted to millions of dollars and since
most of the mercantilist establishments and some of the
factories belonged to Spaniards, the commerce of Chi
huahua City crumbled.
to just Spanish.

Villa did not limit his demands

He also seized a department store,

valued at $1,500,000, owned jointly by French, German,
English and Spanish interests and placed a rebel leader.
General Manuel Chao in charge of it.

He also seized

400 tons of coal from the American Smelting and Refining
Company.

The loss of the coal, added to the large

35
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forced loan that Huerta exacted from the company
earlier, presaged the closure of the company's plants
37
in Chihuahua.
By the end of 1913* Villa had seized over $5*000,
000 dollars in foreign property.

He justified all of

his actions when he declared that the property belonged
to the poor.

Thanks to Villa, the rebel war fund increased

tremendously at the expense of dozens of frightened for
eign investors, many of whom fled from Mexico.^®
Saltillo, Coahuila, began 1914 in much the same
condition as Torreon and Chihuahua City.

Rebels cut

off all supplies of food and communications to the city
and as a result, food prices rose.

Coffee, which earlier

sold for ninety cents per kilo now cost three pesos.
Merchants, forced to raise prices because of the shortage,
were violently chastized by the Mexican press and antiforeign sentiment grew once again.

General Maass, the

Federal commander, collected 40,000 pesos from the banks
and merchants for what he called his "reserve fund" to
buy prime necessity items.

Because of the conditions,

some businesses closed down rather than accept government
script, which would be worthless if the rebels captured

37
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the city.

The incarceration of the manager of a Syrian

concern because he refused to accept the script, con
vinced many merchants how foolish it would be to remain
open for business if they did not accept the government's
money.39
After the Americans occupied Veracruz in April,
191^» anti-American sentiment in Saltillo increased.
Federales incarcerated a number of Americans and civil
ian mobs formed throughout the town shouting "Muerto los
gringos", "Death to the gringos".

The American Consul,

John R. Silliman, and an American physician. Dr. Herbert
Saunders, were among those jailed.

Saunders, a retired

United States Army surgeon, spent fifteen days in jail.
The Federales searched Saunders and confiscated his
watch, money, and hat as soon as he arrived at the jail.
During the ordeal, the jailers struck Saunders several
times, threw him down two flights of cement stairs and
finally locked him up in a cell three feet square.

Water

and filth covered the cell floor and Saunders did not
have any bedding.

He remained there for twenty-four

hours before he received some foul-smelling soup and
dirty water.

The Federales forced Silliman to divulge

the combination to the safe at the consulate.

They then

^^Silliman to Bryan, 12 January 191^ /10633»
4 March 191^ /11139.
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opened the safe, took all of his valuables and important
papers, including the American code book.

Besides the

incarceration and harrassment doled out to the Americans,
the Federales also looted and burned the Purcell Bank
and Mazapil Copper Company, British concerns.

The

cashier of the bank and three employees at the copper
company died in the robberies.

The Federales then moved

to the German owned Seiber Hardware Store, one of the
biggest in Mexico, and looted it.^°
In April, Villa returned to Torreon.

While lay

ing seige to the city. Villa forced the British Viceconsul at Torreo'n, H. S. Cunard - Cummings, to enter
Torreon and demand the surrender of the Federales under
Velasco.

Villa told Cunard - Cummings that if he did

not go, he would have his brains blown out.

Villa almost

sent George C. Carothers, the American Consul, but decided
instead that Velasco knew Cunard - Cummings better.

Upon

taking possession of the city. Villa rounded up all the
Spanish into three buildings.

He uncharacteristically

told them that he would not kill them because he did not
want foreign nations to call him an assassin.

However,

he said that they must be expelled for their own protec
tion because his men, violently anti-Spanish, would kill
them if they had a chance.

Therefore, six hundred Spanish

^^New York Times, 30 April 191^; 23 May 191^
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residents left Torreon on a special train that Villa
provided.

The Spaniards left behind $15*000,000 worth

of cotton and Villa immediately sent $1,000,000 of it
to El Paso.
When Huerta resigned in July, 1914 and Villa
and Carranza struggled for power, foreign business
received another setback.

To finance their campaigns,

they both resorted to large forced loans and other mea
sures from which foreigners could not escape.
Merchants in Chihuahua constantly felt the wrath
of Villa.

In July, 1915» Villa called a meeting of all

the merchants in Chihuahua City and accused them of
robbing the people.

From that point on, he said he

would take drastic measures to keep the merchants from
selling at extortion prices.

He seized all the stocks

of merchandise in the city, native and foreign alike.
Foreigners were to be paid cost plus fifteen per cent
for their goods, but native merchants contributed
everything for the good of the Revolution.

Villistas

looted all the stores and then distributed the goods
to the city's poor.

He forced all foreign merchants to

accept his money at thirty cents on the dollar and
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Carothers to Bryan, 6 April 1914 /ll4l9; New
York Times, 6 April 1914; 9 April 1914; and 10 April

95
hp
ordered them to raise a forced loan of $300,000 gold.
Villa became extremely belligerent toward Ameri
cans after the United States recognized Carranza in the
Fall of 1915*

Bandits kidnapped an American employee

of the Madera Lumber Company for a ransom of $10,000
gold, but when the Company sent the money to save the
man's life, the Villistas intercepted the agents carry
ing the ransom and confiscated it, sealing the man's
doom.

Villistas also arrested James Brennerman, manager

/
of the Santa Rosalia Smelter of the Guggenheim interests
in Chihuahua.

Two weeks later. Villa confiscated the
kT
whole plant and operated it for the rebel cause. ^
As the year came to a close. Villa moved back
into Chihuahua City once again and demanded more food
and money from the foreign merchants.

Some of the mer

chants refused his demands, so his men looted and destroyed
many of the stores.

From Chihuahua City, the Villistas

moved back to Madera, where they held thirty American
employees of the Madera Lumber Company until the Company
paid the 500,000 peso forced loan Villa levied against
them.

After they left the lumber company, the Villistas

k2
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looted and destroyed American homes throughout the town.
Many Americans, forewarned of Villa's coming, left the
town, narrowly missing being killed by Villa and his
troops, who pursued them for miles before giving up the
chase.

The bitter Villa declared that he would destroy

American property every chance he had and that no American was safe in territory he controlled.
Problems for foreigners arose from other quarters
after the Pershing Expedition entered Mexico in search
of Villa.

Anti-American sentiment in the cities pre

saged mob violence, directed mainly at American merchants.
A mob in Torreon, yelling "Viva Villa", looted five
stores, two railroad cars of sugar, one of corn and one
of potatoes.

Merchants quickly bought up all available

com and sold it at cost to alleviate the situation
before more rioting occurred.

Later, a mob, led by the

mayor of Torres, converged on the American consulate,
destroyed all the furniture inside and extensively
damaged the building.

In a meeting in the town Plaza

at the end of the rioting, the mayor urged the populace
4*1
to run all Americans out of the country.
Hungry citizens in Parral, Chihuahua looted

New York Times, 14 December 1915? 15 December 1915.
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stores and warehouses in Parral and in other towns in
the area.

Carrancista forces, witnessed the mob action,

but refused to intervene on behalf of the merchants,
In Chihuahua City, anti-American rioters stoned
foreign homes and businesses and in Piedras Negras,
Coahuila (formerly Ciudad Profirio Diaz), rioters paraded
through the streets carrying large placards which called
upon all Mexicans to take up arms to defend their nation.
In Saltillo, mobs of women from the lower classes stoned
and sacked foreign stores that closed down because of
4?
the conditions.
The Mexican press added fuel to the flame of
\mrest by publishing anti-American articles.

One such

article said that Mexicans in Texas had revolted and
were burning bridges and defeating American forces.

The

article, though untrue, still managed to inspire many
Mexicans.

The situation, completely out of hand, forced

many Americans to leave.

But, some Americans feared for

their safety in traveling, and remained in Mexico.

This

fear was well grounded by Mexican mobs who milled around

i|-6
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railroad stations, chanting "Murder Americans."^®
Villa curtailed his activities during most of
the Punitive Expedition, but by November, 1916, he
returned to action. After he took the area around
/
Santa Rosalia, Chihuahua, a Villista officer, General
Uribe, accused all foreigners of being enemies of Villa's
cause and ordered them all shot.

The Villistas executed

a number of Chinese and Arab residents and one American,
Doctor Fisher.

Uribe gave the prisoners the choice of

either having their ears severed from their head or
execution.

Many of the prisoners chose death rather

than mutilation.

After the executions, Uribe and his

men looted the whole town.^^
y
From Santa Rosalia, the Villistas turned to
Parral where Villa turned extremely barbaric after
taking the city.

He issued a manifesto which stated

that he planned to confiscate all American property
and that he would kill any American or Mexican who
worked for American companies.

He also ordered the

execution of a German merchant, Theodore Hoemuller,
and his wife and baby.

The German aroused Villa's

anger because he displayed 18 pairs of ears and a letter

UR

Cobb to Lansing, 10 June 1916 /18376j Blocker
to Lansing 16 June I9I6
^^New York Times, 5 November I9I6.

99
containing insulting epithets addressed to Villa.

The

ears had been severed from Carranza soldiers and a
Carrancista General placed them in Hoemuller*s store
window.

Villa ordered the ears severed from the

Carrancistas so he could recognize them the next time
they met.

The Villistas also castrated some of the

Carrancista officers.

Villa's acts of vicious brutal

ity increased as he executed all the remaining foreigners
in Parral and then murdered over 200 Chinese, many of
whom had businesses between Parral and Jimenez.
Early in December, 1916, the Villistas returned
to Chihuahua City.

Villa warned all the residents not

to hide foreigners because he planned to kill them all,
confiscate all their property, and give it to the Mexi
can people.

Villistas looted foreigners* homes and

businesses, carried off what they could and burned the
rest.

The bandits loaded two full trains with the loot

they took from the stores in the city.

Villa also

demanded 1,000,000 pesos from the residents, which he
received, or he would burn the town.

Scores of China

men and Mexicans perished and the bodies were strewn

L. C. Neale, Attorney for the American Smelting
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all over the city.^^
Villa turned from Chihuahua City back to Torreon
and by the last part of December, he took the town.

Dur

ing his stay there, his men murdered sixty Chinese, five
Arabs and eighty Carranza sympathizers.

Many bodies

remained in the street for over two weeks.

Villa con

fiscated 150 cars of merchandise from merchants and
industrial plants, and levied a $100,000 forced loan
on the inhabitants.

The Villistas left no hiding place

unchecked in their search for Americans.

British sub

jects saved their lives only by providing birth certi
ficates that proved they were not Americans.

Villa

entered the town with 2,000 men, but left with somewhere
between 5»000 to 10,000 as many former Villistas joined
up with him again.

Villa abandoned the 150 cars of

merchandise he took when he ran out of coal to run his
train a few miles North of the town.^^
From 1917 to 1920, Villa seemed to enjoy complete
freedom to come and go wherever he wanted.

In fact,

in 1918 he blew up the gas plant, engines and smelter
of a $500,000 American power plant only to show the
United States that Carranza could not guarantee his

^^New York Times, 2 December I916; 8 December
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earlier promises to protect foreigners and their pro
perty.

Although his movement lost its momentum. Villa

periodically would retake a town and put pressure on
the businessmen and foreigners.

Such was the case in

March, 1919 when the Villistas entered Pearson, Chihua
hua, killed three Chinamen, robbed several stores of
over $30,000 worth of merchandise and robbed several
Americans of their money, jewelry, clothing and horses.
The amazing part of this episode lay in the fact that
the Villistas did not kill the Americans.

The vengeance

of Villa had definitely mellowed toward Americans by
this time.

When Villa and his band raided Muzquiz, Coa-

huila. Villa kidnapped an American, Frederick G. Hugo,
but released him without receiving any of the $10,000
ransom he asked for.

Hugo became so fascinated with

Villa that he invited him home for Christmas dinner.
Villa finally made his peace with everyone in
July, 1920, but just for old times* sake, on his way
to his retirement plantation, he stopped off long
enough in Sabinas, Coahuila to steal 80 horses from
American ranches in the vicinity and to obtain a forced
loan of 30,000 pesos to pay his troops.

^^Fall Committee Report, I1IO96; Edward Dow to
Lansing, 13 March 1919 /2256O; New York Times, I6
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The death and destruction of the Revolution was
much more pronounced in the cities than in the rural
areas.

Victimized by Mexican city dwellers, rebels,

bandits and Federales, foreigners were often trapped in
the cities and forced to endure the hardships of hunger,
pestilence and disease.

Events such as the Pershing

Expedition and the United States intervention at Vera
cruz brought more hardships as Mexicans took out their
anti-American hatred on those living amongst them.
Pancho Villa viciously treated all foreigners
during the Revolution, but to say that he alone bore
the responsibility for the foreigners' plight is not
true.

Federales imposed many hardships on them, and

Carranza, especially, made life miserable for foreigners
in the city.

He forced them to accept his worthless

money, under threat of death, and levied forced loans
against them so he could pay off his troops and aid the
needy.
Bandits and Mexican mobs meant more danger to the
foreigner.

Living in the peace of the city while the

Revolution fermented in the rural areas, the foreigner
felt rather safe.

But, as the Revolution intensified

and as each contending faction swept through the cities
seeking money, materials and revenge, the foreigner
found himself living in a "deathtrap".

CHAPTER V

FOREIGNERS, THE LAW, AND TAXATION
Besides the physical depredations imposed upon
them by Mexicans, foreigners in Mexico were also sub
jected to a number of special laws and decrees that
placed added burdens on their shoulders.

The rulings

mostly affected the mining industry, but, foreign
merchants, ranchers and railroadmen also suffered from
the effects of the numerous laws and decrees promulgated
by various individuals during the Revolution.
Reaction to foreign control of Mexican riches
appeared very evident before the Revolution began.

The

Mine Law of 1910, effective as of January 1, 1910,
resulted from anti-foreign agitation beginning as early
as 1904,

Articles 141 through 1^3 of the new law pro

vided that prior permission must be given to any for
eigner or joint foreign-Mexican enterprise before they
could hold mining property in the border states.

The

days of the foreign miner moving to Mexico and staking
out a claim, without consulting Mexican officials, had
ceased.^

1

Bernstein, The Mexican Mining Industry 1890-1950,
pp. 78-79.
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/

/

With the removal of Diaz, Abraham Gonzalez,
Governor of Chihuahua, issued a decree designed to

/

rescind some of the privileges that Diaz had given to
foreign investors.

The decree stated that foreign con

cessions which might have been regarded as monopolies
would not be extended or renewed.

/

Gonzalez also ordered

that every legal effort be made to restrict all foreign
monopolies that currently existed in Chihuahua.

The

Governor further decreed that every property owner,
Mexican and foreign alike, would pay taxes to rebel
officials.

The new decree forced foreigners who owned

cattle ranches, mines or lumber companies to pay customs
on exports as well.

From that point on, foreign capital

would have to compete with Mexican capital in quest of
government concessions.

Since American, German and

British interests controlled most of the properties,
the business scene took on a new look.^
Mining companies in Chihuahua and Coahuila faced
/
more trouble after Gonzalez*decree. As the Orozco
rebellion unfolded, Orozco's forces collected the mine
taxes that the miners normally paid to the Federal
Government.

Under Mexican law, if the miners were one

month late on their taxes, they paid a fine of 50 per

2

New York Times, 16 June 1911? Beezley, Insurgent
Governor, p. 62.
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cent of the tax.

Being two months late cost a 100 per

cent fine and after three months tardiness, the title
to their property reverted back to the Government.

The

American Department of State advised the miners to pay
the taxes to Orozco and to obtain a receipt for them.
The Department then sent word to Madero that they
regarded the payment of taxes to Orozco as completely
fulfilling all tax obligations.

Madero agreed to this

policy, alleviating the miners* predicament for the
time being.
The problem of double taxation arose again during
Huerta*s reign.

The Constitutionalists forced the min

ers to pay taxes to them because Carranza refused to
recognize receipts of taxes paid to the Federal Govern
ment.

Once again, the miners did not know to whom they

should pay taxes.

Many miners, more fearful of the Huerta

regime than they were of Madero*s, paid double taxes to
protect their property titles.

They paid the taxes even

though the United States Department advised Huerta that
the miners* tax obligation had been fulfilled when they
3
paid their taxes to the Constitutionalists.

L. Wilson to Knox, 21 August 1912, 812.512/5?
J. W. Austin, Mine owner, to Bryan, 7 July 1913» 812.512/
51; J. B. Moore, for Bryan, to Austin, 18 July 1913» 812.
512/51* Memorandum from U.S. Department of State, 30
August 1913* 812.512/83^; and Bernstein, The Mexican
Mining Industry I89O-I950# p. I06.

106
The chaotic conditions of the Constitutionalist
rebellion forced the closure of many foreign mining
concerns and Carranza exacerbated the foreigners* plight
when he decreed in April, 1913* that it constituted a
felony for foreigners to close down their mines or mills.
Carranza*3 assertion revolved around the fact that the
closures definitely demonstrated the miners* sympathy
for the Huerta Government.

The miners then, reluctantly

continued operations, even in the face of rebel and
bandit incursions.

Protection from the dissident ele

ments fell upon the mine owners themselves, but when
Carranza decreed that all foreigners possessing fire
arms after May 21, 1913» would receive a ten year jail
sentence, the miners lost their only means of protec4
tion.
Carranza did not limit his taxes to just mining
concerns.

In February, 1914, he raised the cattle

export taxes in areas controlled by the Constitutional
ists,

Ranchers paid an additional eight pesos per head

to export calves, twelve pesos for cattle one (1) year
old, sixteen pesos for steers two (2) years and over,
and an additional twenty pesos for each bull and cow
over two (2) years old.

Carranza used the extra money

4
New York Times, 26 April 1913; Ellsworth to
Bryan, 29 May 1913 /7646.
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brought in by the tax increase to purchase more arms
and ammunition.^
In May, 1914, Carranza took a firmer stand
against the foreign mine owners around Parral, Chihua
hua who had shut down operations.

A new decree stated

that unless the owners return to the district within
fifteen days and resume operations of their properties,
their mines would be confiscated and operated for the
benefit of the Mexican people.

By August, Carranza had

confiscated a number of unworked properties throughout
Chihuahua, and those that he did not confiscate had
their taxes doubled.

Also in August, with Huerta deposed,

Carranza voided all mine titles that had been registered
by Huerta.

Those who had received titles from Huerta

had to reapply for new titles from the Carranza Govern
ment.

Carranza also stated that Huerta's tax laws would

be replaced by a forthcoming new tax program.^
When Villa began his struggle against Carranza,
both sides needed revenue to sustain their armies.

To

the mine owners fell most of the financial burden of
keeping Carranza*s forces in the field since his new

^611.127/32, Taken from the El Paso Times, 15
February 1914.
^New York Times, 15 May 1914; 7 August 1914; and
Bernstein, The Mexican Mining Industry I890-I950, p.

107.
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mining law doubled the export taxes on ores and metals.
He placed the taxes on an absolute rather than on an
ad valorem basis and if the miners missed three install
ments, he automatically concelled the titles to their
mines.

The tax intended not only to collect more money,

but also to force production by making idleness too
costly because taxes had to be paid whether the mine
7
operated or not.
Carranza kept the pressure on the mine owners
into 1916, and on May 1, he dealt them a crusing blow
with a new massive tax program.

The new program levied

taxes on the basis of the number of claims that one had,
and since most foreigners, especially Americans, had
over 2,500 acres of claims, the program proved devasta
ting.

On gold and silver mines the tax was $6 a year

for each claim if one had 1 to 10 claims, $12 a year if
one had 11 to 50 claims, $18 a year for 51 to 100 claims
and $2^ a year if one had 101 claims or more.

For

mines bearing non-precious metals, the tax called for
$6 a year for each claim if one had 1 to 50 claims, $12
a year for 51 to 200 claims, $18 a year for 201 to 500
claims and $24 a year on each claim if one had 50I
claims or more.

The new law also imposed a ten per cent

"^Letcher to Bryan, 3 March 1915» 812.512/57^?
Bernstein, The Mexican Mining Industry I890-I950, pp.
109-110.
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export tax ad valorem on gold and silver and a five per
cent export tax on other minerals.

Carranza designed

his program to force people to stake out a small number
of claims that would be worked, and to discourage the
holding of large tracts of land, held only for specula
tion purposes.®
Carranza, in I9I6, also ordered all foreign
factories to quadruple the wages they paid their Mexican
laborers and to pay them three months wages if they
closed down, but clearly, his attention focused mainly
on the mine owners.

A serious crises confronted the

owners during the Pershing Expedition when Carranza,
angry with the miners because of their support of the
expedition, imposed additional laws on them.

Under the

new laws, foreigners intent on securing any concessions
in Mexico had to renounce, in advance, appeals to their
own governments, under penalty of forfeiture.

Foreigners,

once they received a concession, had to operate it con
tinuously for the concession to remain in force.

For

eign owners also could not apply for a concession unless
they "nationalized" themselves and held their property
through a Mexican subsidiary and filed an affadavit to

New York Times, 2 May I916; 14 September I9l6j
and Bernstein, The Mexican Mining Industry I89O-I950,
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that effect.

The new laws soon became part of the Mexican Con
stitution of 1917, a revolutionary document that had a
tremendous impact on all foreign investors in Mexico.
Carranza, in September I9I6, called for a constitutional
convention to bring the Mexican Constitution up to date
and to embody the goals that the Revolution had achieved.
Parts of the Constitution, written in December, I9I6,
and put into effect on February 5» 191?» had promised
to "give Mexico back to the Mexicans",

Various sections,

chiefly Articles 2?, 28, 33 and 123, severely limited
the activities of foreigners in Mexico.
The first of these. Article 27, strove to remove
/
one of the Diaz acts which allowed foreigners to acquire
property because it declared the State to be the original
and sole owner of all lands, waters, and subsoil wealth.
The laws put forth by Carranza during the Summer of I9I6,
relating to who could receive concessions, also found
their way into this Article.

Furthermore, Article 27

prohibited foreigners from owning land within thirty
miles of the Mexican coastline and sixty miles of the
border.

The Mexican Government also had the right to

expropriate foreign owned properties, but they had to

9

Gerhardt, England and The Mexican Revolution
I9IO-I920, p. ^23; Bernstein, The Mexican Mining Industry 1890-1950. pp. 111-113.
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pay appropriate compensation for them.
Article 28 of the Constitution ended all the
specific exemptions from taxation which the Diaz Admin
istration had so generously bestowed upon some foreigners
and foreign owned companies.
According to Article 33» foreigners possessed
rights like Mexican citizens.

But, the President had

the right to deport any foreigner without benefit of a
prior trial or judgement if the foreigner proved to be
troublesome.

This Article also prohibited foreigners

12
from interfering in Mexican political affairs.
The last of the four articles, number 123, struck
at the labor problem.

Mexican laborers received an

eight-hour work day, a six-day week, minimum wage', equal
pay for equal work and the right to organize unions and
to strike.^3
Carranza considered many of the provisions of
the Constitution to be too radical, far exceeding his
proposals, so he ignored most of it.

However, the Con

stitution gradually became a reality to Mexicans and

^^Atkin, Revolution!, pp. 298-299.
^^Gerhardt, England and The Mexican Revolution
1910-1920, p. 446.
^^New York Times, 3 February 1917•
^^Atkin, Revolution!» p. 299.
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with its implementation, the foreigner became constitu
tionally controlled and his favored position disappeared.
To live, work and own property in Mexico, he had to
become "Mexicanized"
After the Constitution went into effect, mine
owners found no immediate relief from Carranza.

On

February, 1917* Carranza ordered all non-operating mines
that had not filed acceptable reasons for their dormancy
to be confiscated by the Mexican Government.

Mexican

cities added more tax burdens to the miners when in
April they demanded payment of local taxes.

These new

taxes, coupled with the Federal Government's doubling
of the stamp tax on export minerals in December, 1917,
created even more hardships.

Fortunately, by mid 1918,

Carranza began to mellow as he permitted all mining
machinery and parts to be admitted duty free to Mexico.
The New Tax Law of 1918, lowered the rates set in 1916
and decreased the penalties for non-working mines.

Car

ranza also eased the restrictions on those foreigners
seeking new concessions.

Furthermore, in 1919* he

decreased taxes on precious metals and made concessions
to those delinquent in their tax payments.

To encourage

resumption of operations, miners could pay all their

Gerhardt, England and The Mexican Revolution
1910-1920, pp. 437-438; New York Times, 3 February 1917»
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taxes for the years preceding 1919» installment for
installment with their current taxes and without penalty*
Outside of Carranza's refusal to return any of the pro
perty confiscated from mine owners who resided abroad
during I9I9, and therefore had no legal rights in Mexico,
Carranza finally began to "ease off" the foreign mine
owner.
The foreign investor in Mexico before the Revolu
tion had numerous advantages over the native Mexicans,
but as the struggle progressed, he eventually saw those
advantages fade away.

As one warring faction and then

another controlled an area, owners either had to pay
taxes to both sides or face having their property con
fiscated.

The threat of confiscation also hovered over

their heads if they did not continue operating their
concerns, even though war conditions made it economically
unfeasible and extremely dangerous to do so.

Delegated

to the role of financing much of the long struggle, the
foreign investor, paying out increased taxes and wages
and underwriting other labor benefits, never again

^^New York Times, 21 February 191?» 15 December
1917; Cobb to Lansing, 1? April I917, 812.512/1659?
Gerhardt, England and The Mexican Revolution 1910-1920,
p. M-99; and Bernstein, The Mexican Mining Industry
1890-1950, pp. 120-122.
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reaped the huge profits he enjoyed during the Porfiriato.
With the promulgation of the Constitution of 191?» the
foreigner's "heyday" came to an end.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
/
When Porfirio Diaz sent out the call for foreign
capital, Mexico became flooded with investors, eager to
/
take advantage of Diaz* generous concessions. While

/
the foreigner and the Diaz administration grew wealthy
as Mexico's economy flourished, the Mexican masses still

/
floundered in poverty.

Small wonder that as the Diaz

administration pampered and protected the foreigner, yet
repressed the masses, anti-foreign hatred grew to enormous
proportions in Mexico.

When the Diaz regime fell in 1910,

this bitter hatred burst forth in brutal fashion from all
quarters of Mexico.
In many ways, those foreigners who remained in
Mexico during the Revolution contributed something to
its continuance.

Robbed constantly by all sides, the

only lucky foreigner was the one who did not meet death.
Rebels, such as Pancho Villa, felt that the foreigners*
wealth came from the people so when the people needed
that wealth, they should be able to take it back.

This

type of attitude must have influenced Woodrow Wilson who
looked upon Villa as being similar to Robin Hood, who
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also robbed the rich to pay the poor.^
Revolutionaries robbed and plundered at will
during the Revolution in order to maintain their struggle.
Nothing seemed to be too large or useless to steal.

Any

one's livestock, clothing, blankets, arms or money
became fair game to the rebels.

Foreigners, especially

those with some wealth, were favorite targets for the
rebels who kidnapped them for ransom.
Mines, ranches, and railroads in the unprotected
rural areas became easy prey for the roaming bands of
rebels and bandits.

Although the rural areas had their

problems, the vicious brutality of the Revolution was
best exemplified in the cities.
City residents suffered unbelievable depredations
as the cities, taken by one group and then retaken by
another, wallowed in a state of continuous chaos.

Food

always remained in short supply and the money available
to buy that food, often became of no value as contend
ing forces refused to accept the opposition's currency.^
Foreign merchants, consistantly blamed for high food
prices, faced the vengeance of hungry mobs, often

^Guzman, Memoirs of Pancho Villa, p. 4-63; Ger
hardt, England and The Mexican Revolution 1910-1920,
p. 320.
2
/
Jamieson, Tulitas of Torreon, p. 13^; Gerhardt,
England and The Mexican Revolution 1910-1920, p. 120.
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aroused to a frenzy by the presence of American troops
on Mexican soil, or by blatant anti-foreign editorials
in the Mexican press.
The cities also witnessed the most devastating
destruction of foreign property and lives.

Bloody

massacres of Chinese and Spanish merchants lent an air
of horror to the long and bitter struggle.

Bodies,

sometimes horribly mangled from torture tactics, lined
the streets of Torreon and Parral on more than one
occasion.

Pestilence, death and disease walked the

streets of every Mexican city and town during the tur
moil.
The fury of the Revolution devastated Mexico,
but out of the ruins emerged a sense of Mexican Nation
alism so intense that a new nation arose, a nation of
Mexicans.

The foreigner, for so long a dominating

factor in Mexico, would never become a singularly dom
inant factor again.
The plight of the foreigner can best be summed

/
up by the use of some revealing statistics.

When Diaz

left office approximately 31,70? Americans lived in
Mexico and by September, 1919* this figure had decreased
to just 8,882.

It was estimated that 3^5 American

civilians lost their lives during the Revolution, yet
if one includes the scores of other foreigners and
American military men who also died, and takes into
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account the fact that American property losses alone
totaled over $500,000,000, the impact that the Revo
lution had on foreigners becomes quite significant .3
Many of the foreign fatalities occurred in Chihuahua and
Coahuila because in these two states the struggle began
and continuously intensified through the years.
Perhaps the only consolation that the harassed
foreigner might have received from his suffering during
the Revolution was the fact that Pancho Villa, perhaps
the cruelest rebel of all, had faced similar troubles.
For, when Villa retired to his estate at Canutillo,
Durango, he appealed to President Obregon to protect
him from marauding bandits who had robbed him of 200
head of horses.^

Perhaps this was a fitting reward to

one of the greatest bandits of them all.

^Fall Committee Report, It863-865; 2:3399*
h.
New York Times, 19 December 1920.
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